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FROM 


NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1991 
PB 70-91-6 

Assistant Secretary 
of the Army 

(Research, Development 
and Acquisition) 

STEPHEN K. CONVER 

Commanding General 
U.S. Army Materiel Command 

GEN WILLIAM G. T. TUTTLE, JR. 

EDITORIAL ADVISORY 
BOARD MEMBERS 

STEPHEN K. CONVER 

Chairman, Editorial Advisory Board 

LTG AUGUST M. CIANCIOLO 

Director of 

Acquisition Career Management 

LTG BILLY M. THOMAS 

Deputy Commanding General for RD&A 
U.S. Army Materiel Command 

MG LARRY D. BUDGE 

Assistant DCSPER 

MG RICHARD T. TRAVIS 

Commanding General 
U.S. Army Medical R&D Command 

GEORGE T. SINGLEY, III 

Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Research & Technology 
Office of the ASA (RDA) 

DR. ROBERT B. OSWALD 

Director of R&D 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

HARVEY L. BLEICHER 

Managing Editor 
Executive Secretary 
Editorial Advisory Board 


EDITORIAL STAFF 

HARVEY L. BLEICHER 

Managing Editor 

MELODY B. RATKUS 

Associate Editor 

DEBRA L. FISCHER 

Assistant Editor 

Army RD&A Bulletin (ISSN 0892-8657) is published bimonthly by 
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rent and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for 
the purpose of enhancing their professional development. 


By Order of the Secrelary of the Army: 


GORDON R SULLIVAN 
General, United States Army 

Official: Chief of Staff 

MILTON H HAMILTON 
Administrative Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Army 


ARMY 

Research 
Development 
Acquisition 

BULLETIN 

Professional Bulletin of the RD&A Community 


FEATURES 


Military Lessons Learned from the Gulf War 

CDT Jason T. Hoffman 1 

Physical Security Equipment Management 

Emanuel J. Nidhiry and ETC Larry J. Petcu 4 

Technology Transfer— It’s the Law 

James A. Ball 8 

ETDL Inventor Receives $10,000 from Patent Fees 

Carol A Widmaier 1 1 

Environmental Clean-up of Explosives Contaminated Soils 

LTC Larry A. Sparks and MAJ Craig A. Myler 13 

The Army Center of Excellence for Advanced Propulsion 
Systems Research 

Gary Borman, Phil Myers and David Mann 16 

Implementing the In-Plant Quality Evaluation Process 

CPI William J. Belknap 19 

Chemical Weapons Treaty Verification 

Richard 1 N. Hutchinson, Robert E. Lentz and Stephen L. English 22 

U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command and Tank-Automotive 
Research, Development and Engineering Center 26 

The Army Industrial Modernization Incentives Program 

Eddie Japzon 30 

Innovative Operational Testing 

MAJ Laurence A. Womack 33 

Therapy in HIV Patients Using Recombinant GP160 Vaccine 

LTC Robert R. Redfield, MC 36 

Application of Level of Repair Analysis 

Nicholas R Giordiano 38 

TACOM Develops Ml Mine Clearing Robot 

John J. Schmitz and George Taylor 42 


DEPARTMENTS 


RD&A News Briefs 43 

Letters 46 

Speaking Out 47 

Career Development Update 48 

Book Reviews 50 

From the Army Acquisition Executive 53 


COVER 


The collective expertise of a 55-member team from the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies has provided an in-depth analysis of the military 
lessons learned from the Gulf War. Cover designed by Joe Day, DOIM 
Graphics Section at HQ AMC. 






Dioi.sz/a \/Q> 

By CDT Jason T. Hoffman 


Since the end of the Gulf War in 
March, the U.S. Military has tasked itself 
with assessing its performance in the 
war. After action reports such as these 
are standard procedure for the modern 
military. While those on Uncle Sam’s 
payroll busied themselves with study- 
ing the war, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), a 
Washington based think tank, also 
began looking for lessons to be learn- 
ed from the conflict in the Persian Gulf. 
CSIS published what is perhaps the first 
in-depth analysis of the war conducted 
by a non-governmental organization. 

The report, entitled The Gulf War: 
Military Lessons Learned , is the in- 
terim result of a six month long study 
that drew upon the collective expertise 
of a 55 member team, and will even- 
tually be published as a book. The 
study group, headed byjim Blackwell, 
Mike Mazarr and Don Snider, was com- 
posed of CSIS analysts and subject area 
experts from industry, government and 
the military. The report outlines seven 
major lessons that will impact future 
decisions regarding force structure and 
defense procurement. 

Lesson one sets the tone for the rest 
of the report. In summary, it states that 
there are severe limitations on our abili- 
ty to draw conclusions based on the 
Gulf War, because it was in fact a uni- 
que war: 

All wars are unique, but 
this war — its enemy, its ter- 
rain, and a host of other 
features was even more dis- 
tinctive than most. Whether 
any major, long-term les- 
sons can be drawn at all 
from the Gulf War is in fact 
questionable. 

This note of caution is not meant to 
diminish the value of information that 
has been and will continue to be col- 
lected with respect to the performance 
of allied troops and equipment in bat- 
tle. It simply means that the distinctive 
nature of the Gulf War places con- 
straints on our ability to draw lessons. 

The idea of the U.S. being dependent 
on it allies for military security is distur- 
bing to many. However, because there 
is great instability in the international 
security system as it moves away from 
a condition of bipolarity, the project 


MILITARY 

LESSONS 

LEARNED 

FROM 

THE 

GULF WAR 

An Analysis 
from the Center 
for Strategic and 
International 
Studies 



November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 1 


Despite 
some 
changes 
for the 
better, 
the 
brunt 
of U.S. 
Defense 
Strategy 
is 
still 

inappropriately 

focused 

on 

countering 

the 

Soviet 

threat. 


found that the war demonstrates, “The 
U.S. is both politically and logistically 
dependent upon its friends and allies.’ ’ 
This dependency is the substance of the 
second major lesson discovered by the 
study group. This dependence means 
that, “The option of going it alone’ 
simply does not exist, and all foreign 
and defense policy decisions must be 
made with this realization.’’ 

The study group found that the use 
of high tech weapons in war was the 
result of a “revolution in warfare.' ' This 
revolution, it is argued, brought about 
a corresponding change in tactics and 
strategy. The stud}' group had this to say 
in the report: 

New tactics might resem- 
ble guerilla warfare writ 
large: smaller, agile, steal- 
thy units stage hit-ancl-run 
raids with tanks, armored 
cars, artillery, and helicop- 
ters integrated with tactical 
air support. 

The fourth lesson of the report is one 
that is often obscured by the debate 
over weapons systems and defense ac- 
quisition. It is, quite simply, that the 
quality of military personnel is what 
matters most in any military force. The 
wonders of technology were celebrated 
on television nightly during Desert 
Storm, but the fact remains that these 
weapons are useless unless deployed in 
the hands of capable and well-trained 
people. The overall pre-combat profi- 
ciency of American military personnel 
in Desert Storm was higher than that 
of any previous war. The trouble is that 
such training is costly. Realistic train- 
ing requires continuing allocations of 
resources such as time, money, and 
equipment. 

For the four Cold War decades, the 
U.S. shaped its armed forces and 
designed its weapons systems with an 
eye towards the Soviet Union. Since 
1989, the relationship between the 
superpowers has warmed significantly. 
The fifth lesson is that, despite some 
changes for the better, the brunt of U.S. 
defense strategy is still inappropriate- 
ly focused on countering the Soviet 
threat. Other threats, such as Iraq, will 
present a different kind of challenge for 
the future. 

The sixth lesson has to do with the 
theory of deterrence. The Persian Gulf 
crisis provided a model for studying 
perceptions in communications be- 
tween belligerent nations. A message 


intended to convey deterrence may not 
always be perceived as intended if even 
received at all. Subtleties in language, 
culture and regional politics prevent 
signals from not always being received 
as intended from across national 
boundaries. 

The seventh and final lesson enu- 
merated in the report has clear implica- 
tions for the future of defense related 
planning. As established in the first 
point of the report, the war in the Per- 
sian Gulf was, in many ways, very 
unique. It was an unforeseen conflict 
on a rather large scale. Other recent 
military operations, such as Urgent 
Fury in Grenada and Just Cause in 
Panama, were of short duration and re- 
quired the deployment of distinctly dif- 
ferent forces than Desert Storm 
required. Understanding the variety of 
missions and potential contingencies 
that might arise, a “balanced defense 
investment strategy” becomes im- 
perative in defense decision making. 

The combined weight of the lessons 
enumerated in the CSIS report calls for 
an immediate plan for adapting our na- 
tion’s defense. In the coming months, 
decision makers in Washington will 
make a multitude of decisions which 
will lay the foundation for the U.S. 
military capabilities well into the 
twenty-first century. Recognizing this 
situation, the study group has syn- 
thesized a list of 10 principles to guide 
defense investments in the near future: 

• Place greatest emphasis on the 
quality of military personnel. 
Although modernization in weapons 
technologies has always and will con- 
tinue to change the nature of warfare 
and strategy, it is competent, well- 
trained servicemen and leaders that 
ultimately win the wars. Defense in- 
vestment strategies should be shaped 
around this principle. 

• Logistics wins wars. This is a 
lesson that has been repeatedly forgot- 
ten and relearned by countless armies 
throughout history. Rommel had in- 
credible strike capabilities with his 
blitzkrieg tactics in the desert, but his 
army outran its supply trains. Without 
beans and bullets, they became vulner- 
able to allied forces. In Operation 
Desert Storm, the U.S. staged the largest 
airlift of troops and equipment in his- 
tory. But it still was too little too slow. 
If the situation had been slightly dif- 
ferent and Iraq had attacked the 82nd 
Airborne soon after deployment, the 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


light rapid deployment forces would 
have served as little more than a speed 
bump for the then-massed Iraqi army. 

• Given U.S. political, logistical, 
industrial, and economic depend- 
encies, forming international 
coalitions will be necessary for vic- 
tory in any major contingency 
operation. This discovery may disap- 
point those who had neo-isolationist 
hopes for U.S. foreign policy in the post 
Cold War era. This century has seen in- 
creasing connectivity among states 
politically, culturally and economical- 
ly. Multitudes of cross-state ties have 
developed through innovations in 
communications and transportation. In 
Desert Storm, we relied on the help of 
our allies for political support through 
the United Nations. We were logistical- 
ly dependent on them for food, sup- 
plies and fuel to keep our troops and 
equipment running. 

• Tactical ballistic missiles will 
continue to pose a significant 
political and military threat to U.S. 
interests and military forces. Iraq’s 
use of the primitive SCUD missile 
system to terrorize the Israeli and Saudi 
populations demonstrated the political 
impact that even a rudimentary missile 
system, employed in relatively few 
numbers, can have. The proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 
will pose a growing threat to U.S. in- 
terests. 

• Emphasize improvements in 
carrier-based aircraft. Although car- 
rier aircraft were used successfully in 
the Gulf War, they lacked the precision 
“smart” weapons that many Air Force 
aircraft were equipped with. 

• Emphasize improvements in 
mine countermeasures. Ground 
forces were able to employ some 
quickly-fielded anti-mine equipment 
with an amazing degree of success. The 
Air Force used “Daisy Cutter” bombs 
to help to clear the way for ground 
forces. These efforts should continue 
to be developed so that they can be 
employed when needed in the event of 
another conflict. At sea, it was 
discovered that mines, even of the 
World War II vintage, were tying up 
terrible amounts of naval resources that 
could have been otherwise more 
strategically occupied. The U.S. Navy 
must develop more modern and effi- 
cient systems to detect and dispose of 
sea emplaced mines. 

• Maintain amphibious assault 


Tactical ballistic 
missiles will continue 
to pose a significant 
political and military 
threat to U.S. interests 
and military forces. 


capabilities and sufficient expedi- 
tionary forces. The Marines have long 
been and will continue to be essential 
to defense planning as an expedition- 
ary force. The mere threat of a sea land- 
ing was enough to tie up more than 10 
Iraqi divisions during Desert Storm. 

• Exploit the revolution in infor- 
mation technology with command, 
control, and communications sys- 
tems, integrated into a battle 
management architecture, in- 
teroperable throughout the 
theater, as one of the key military 
systems of the future. The fledgling 
JSTARS and the time tested AWACS 
proved to be invaluable in the Gulf War. 
Used in conjunction, the systems great- 
ly aided in providing real time data to 
those who needed it on the battlefield. 

• The participation of U.S. Army 
national guard and reserve combat 
units in contingency operations 
must be re-examined. The combat 
support and combat service support 
units were deployed with little difficul- 
ty in enough time to allow them to pro- 
vide the much needed logistical 
support to operations Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm. The plan to use 
“round-out” units to complement ac- 
tive duty combat units proved difficult 
to implement in the Gulf War. Units 
which were intended to be fleshed-out 
with reserve or national guard com- 
ponents were not called up in time to 
deploy with their active divisions. 
Those divisions instead had to be rein- 
forced with other active duty soldiers 
while the “round-out” units, when 
finally activated, were sent off to train- 
ing centers to be trained to combat stan- 
dards. Desert Storm demonstrated the 
infeasibility of some aspects of the pre- 
sent reserve/national guard mobiliza- 
tion plan for responding to immediate, 
large-scale conflicts. 

• The ability to employ military 


space capabilities in support of 
theater and tactical operations 
proved vital in the Gulf War. 

Satellites proved indispensable from 
the strategic level down to the lowest 
tactical level. Small unit leaders on the 
ground depended on the Global Posi- 
tioning System for accurate positioning 
data. Intelligence generated from 
reconnaissance satellites gave com- 
manders at the brigade level and higher 
a “God's-eye view” of the battlefield. 

There are three major forces which, 
when combined together, will 
drastically change our ability to re- 
spond effectively to a potential threat 
to our national security or to interna- 
tional stability. As mentioned earlier, 
due to the advent of new weapons and 
command and control technologies, 
the nature of warfare has changed 
dramatically. Also, because of the 
warming between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and the simultaneous 
rise of regional powers, the nature of 
the potential threat to our national 
security has changed as well. 

Finally, because of political and 
economic considerations, both interna- 
tionally and within our own country, 
our ability and willingness, as a nation, 
to field and finance a military force, of 
the scale that has been maintained for 
the duration of the Cold War, is no 
longer up to Cold War levels. These 
forces will indeed change our ability to 
ensure security, for our own nation and 
the international community. 


JASON T. HOFFMAN is a first class 
cadet (senior) at the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point. Cadet Hoff- 
man spent several weeks this sum- 
mer as a research analyst at the 
Center for Strategic and Interna- 
tional Studies (CSIS), a Washington 
based think tank. He intends to be 
stationed overseas as a combat 
arms officer 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 3 


PHYSICAL 

SECURITY 

EQUIPMENT 

MANAGEMENT 

A New Challenge for AMC 


On Oct. 13, 1989, the assistant secretary of the Army for research, development 
and acquisition appointed MG Joe W. Rigby, deputy chief of staff for development, 
engineering, and acquisition, Army Materiel Command (AMC), as the Army executive 
agent for physical security equipment (PSE). This appointment brought with it a new 
challenge for AMC to establish a central management structure for Army PSE. 


Background 

During recent years, Congress 
developed a perception that the 
military services were duplicating PSE 
programs, resulting in unnecessary ex- 
penditures. As a result, the Department 
of Defense issued Directive 3224.3 
which assigned specific responsibilities 
for PSE research, development and ac- 
quisition (RDA) to the services and the 
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). The 
Army was assigned responsibility for 
interior PSE, barriers, security lighting 
and command and control systems. 
The Navy was tasked with overseeing 
shipboard and waterside physical 
security systems, explosive detection 
systems and anti-compromise emer- 
gency destruct systems. Exterior PSE, 


By Emmanuel J. Nidhiry 
and LTC Larry J. Petcu 


aerial intrusion detection systems and 
entry control systems responsibilities 
were assigned to the Air Force. The 
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) was 
given responsibility for all PSE-related 
technology base exploratory develop- 
ment (6.2) work. 

Beginning in 1989, Congress con- 
solidated all PSE Research, Develop- 
ment, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
funding at the DOD level. According- 
ly, PSE RDT&E programs were remov- 
ed from the normal review and 
prioritization process of the military 
departments and put under the direct 
control of the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD). A DOD PSE Action 
Group (PSEAG), chaired by an OSD staff 
assistant along with a number of 


subgroups, was formed from elements 
of OSD, the services and the DNA to 
coordinate DOD PSE RDA efforts and 
to disburse PSE RDT&E funds. 

On Feb. 17, 1989, OSD reissued 
DoDD 3224.3, substantially broaden- 
ing the scope of this directive. Among 
other things, it established a DOD PSE 
Steering Group (PSESG) consisting of 
general/flag officer-level represent- 
atives from various DOD components 
to provide oversight for DOD PSEAG 
actions. Also, DoDD 3224.3 required 
the military services to identify a single 
point of contact for PSE who would ad- 
dress and manage PSE programs and 
represent the services at the DOD 
PSESG. The Army responded to this 
direction by appointing MG Rigby as 
the executive agent. 

Army PSE Action Group 
(APSEAG) 

The APSEAG was established by MG 
Rigby in October 1989 to advise and 
support him in centrally coordinating 
and managing the Army PSE program. 
Mirrored after the DOD PSEAG and 
chaired by MG Rigby’s staff, the 
APSEAG includes all key operational, as 
well as RDA, PSE activities of the Ar- 
my. Primary members of the APSEAG 
are: 

• The Security Force Protection and 
Law Enforcement and Nuclear Surety 
and Management Divisions of the Of- 
fice of Deputy Chief of Staff for Opera- 
tions and Plans, Headquarters, 
Department of the Army (HQDA); 

• Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics, (HQDA); 

• U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command; 

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 

• U.S. Army Military Police Opera- 
tions Agency; 

• Project Manager, Nuclear Muni- 
tions; and 

• Project Manager, PSE. 

Army PSE Program Thrusts 

In a 1990 address at the American 
Defense Preparedness Association’s 
Sixth Annual Joint Government- 
Industry Symposium on Security 
Technology, MG Rigby outlined four 
primary evolving thrusts for the Army 
PSE Program. These thrusts are: 

• Infuse emerging technologies 
such as artificial intelligence and 
robotics. This is the key for solving 


4 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 



'®5' r *- ^ _ 

■ ■ ~ : 

* % ,t 


Figure 1. 

Integrated Commercial Intrusion Detection System (ICIDS) Deployment in a typical 
Army installation. 


our current expensive dependency on 
manpower to accomplish our security 
tasks; 

• Buy commercially-developed 
products. This is a good common 
sense approach as our RDT&E budget 
shrinks. 

• Centralize acquisitions. Again, 
this is a common sense strategy to 
realize savings and economies of scale 
associated with large procurements. 
Centralized acquisitions by our com- 
modity commands and sister services 
should be the rule of the future. 

• Build moveable, transportable 
PSE systems. This is a lesson learned 
from recent developments in Europe. 
We have made substantial investment 
there in fixed site physical security 
facilities. Because these facilities were 
not designed to be removed and trans- 
ported, we will be forced to abandon 
many of them as we execute our force 
withdrawal plans. 

The APSEAG has progressed on a 
number of actions to translate these 
evolving thrusts into viable Army PSE 
RDA efforts. 

Integrated Commercial 
Intrusion Detection System 
(ICIDS) 

The ICIDS is a non-developmental 
item acquisition intended to meet the 
joint service requirements for all securi- 
ty applications. The program is design- 
ed to take advantage of rapid advances 
in the commercial state-of-the-art 
technology in intrusion systems. It will 
provide DOD installation commanders 
with a standardized, fully evaluated, 
centrally procured turnkey intrusion 
detection system. This system will con- 
sist of commercially available sensors, 
control units, assessment and entry 
control devices, command and control 
consoles and additional equipment. 
Components will be employed in vary- 
ing quantities and configurations 
depending on the unique physical 
security requirements and operational 
and environmental characteristics of in- 
dividual sites. Figure 1 is a representa- 
tion of the ICIDS deployment in a 
typical Army installation. 

The ICIDS contracting strategy is for 
a firm fixed price, indefinite delivery/ 
indefinite quantity, competitive pro- 
curement including associated site 
survey validation, site specific design, 
installation, contractor logistic sup- 


port, and training efforts. A contract 
award and the first unit equipped are 
scheduled for completion by mid-1992 . 
The first unit equipped will be sub- 
jected to all the required technical and 
user testing and the remaining systems 
will be ordered only if the outcome of 
these tests are satisfactory. Substantial 
procurement commitment for the 
ICIDS has already been received from 
the Air Force. Also, potential ICIDS 
system applications have been iden- 
tified by the Navy. 

Mobile Detection Assessment 
Response System (MDARS) 

MDARS will apply robotic and ar- 
tificial intelligence technology to intru- 
sion detection systems to enhance 
physical security. It will consist of fixed 
and mobile robotic sensor platforms in- 
terfaced with an intrusion detection 
console and will conduct the tasks of 
detection, assessment, intrusion delay, 
response and communications in in- 
terior and exterior environments. This 
will be achieved through the applica- 
tion of interoperable mobility, artificial 
intelligence, sensor, communications, 
weapon, mechanical and electronic 
technologies. Figure 2 is an artist’s con- 
cept of MDARS deployment in a weapon 
storage site. 


MDARS will be developed in three 
phases. Phase I will begin with an 
alarm/barrier/product assessment 
capability of a unit that follows a pre- 
programmed or tele-operated patrol 
path. Its primary function will be 
assessment. Phase II will expand these 
capabilities to include local human 
intruder detection, autonomous 
movement to areas in alarm, operator- 
controlled non-lethal response, and en- 
try/inventory control. Phase III com- 
pletes the expansion with capabilities 
to recognize evidence of intrusion, 
navigate via natural landmarks, delay 
intruders and respond under operator- 
control with lethal force as rules 
permit. 

The fabrication and evaluation of 
prototype Phase I MDARS are current- 
ly underway. During 1993-95, 13 to 15 
systems are planned for production and 
deployment. 

Barrier Applications Systems 
(BAS) Programs 

The BAS programs are envisioned to 
enhance the Army’s nuclear weapons 
security and reduce manpower re- 
quirements through the use of state-of- 
the-art delay techniques for various 
conventional and non-conventional 
weapon storage configurations. One of 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 5 



During a 1990 Security Concepts 
R&D Conference at Fort Belvoir, 
VA, the Army presented a 
prioritized list of 16 proposals 
to DNA for inclusion in its 
1992-97 PSE 6.2 program. 


the projects being pursued under the 
BAS programs is the Sticky Foam Dis- 
pensing System (SFDS). The SFDS will 
supplement the Weapons Access Delay 
System which has been the Army’s 
primary nuclear weapons delay system 
since 1983- Shown in Figure 3, the basic 
component of this system is a commer- 
cially available product commonly 
called “sticky foam” which is kept in a 
pressurized vessel and when perforated 
or ruptured, either on command or by 
forced penetration, expands the pro- 
duct into a sticky foam mass 34 times 
the volume it occupied under pressure. 
Developmental efforts concentrate on 
new applications of this foam. 

SFDS is a continuation of the DNA 6.2 
effort. It was transitioned to the Army 


for advanced development in mid-1990; 
a developmental prove-out model test 
is scheduled in early 1992 and the even- 
tual production of about 30 systems 
during 1993-94. 

Tactical Force Protection 

The Army’s Tactical Force Protection 
Technology (TFPT) program seeks to 
enhance the protection of U.S. forces 
deployed worldwide, particularly in a 
low-intensity conflict or in rear area en- 
vironments through the development 
and production of rapidly deployable 
and disbandable security equipment 
packages, The thrust of the TFPT pro- 
gram is to provide the user with a selec- 
tion of ever-evolving technology in the 
tactical protection environment, par- 


ticularly against a terrorist threat. 

Security and Force Protection 

The Security and Force Protection 
Enhancement Resources (SAFER) 
package is a Limited Procurement 
(Urgent) production program that evolv- 
ed from the Army TFPT effort. It is an 
integrated system of commercial and 
military equipment using manpower, 
equipment and procedures to detect, 
assess, delay and respond to personnel 
attempting to gain unauthorized access 
to U.S. sites. 

A typical company-size SAFER 
package, which takes no more than four 
hours to set up or tear down, includes: 
passive and active infrared sensors, 
seismic and microwave sensors, razor 
tape concertina sensor and barrier, light 
intensifying closed circuit television 
cameras for remote assessment, night vi- 
sion devices for enhanced manual 
assessment, hand-held radios for secure 
communications, electronic call-to- 
arms alarm, and portable display con- 
soles for rapid response decision 
making. 

Initial production of the SAFER 
package started in August 1989. Since 
then, 11 company-size packages were 
produced and deployed worldwide, in- 
cluding a few in support of Operations 
Desert Shield and Storm. Lessons 
learned from these deployments are us- 
ed to enhance the system as part of the 
SAFER pre-planned product improve- 
ment plan. The Miniature Intrusion 
Detection System, a component of 
SAFER, is a potential candidate to 
replace the Army standard Platoon Ear- 
ly Warning System that is in extensive 
use for platoon level tactical perimeter 
and rear area protection. 

PSE Exploratory 
Development 

During a 1990 Security Concepts 
R&D Conference at Fort Belvoir, VA, the 
Army presented a prioritized list of 16 
proposals to DNA for inclusion in its 
1992-97 PSE 6.2 program. Some of the 
technologies that will be investigated 
under these proposals are: 

• the non-lethal uses of low frequen- 
cy sound and/or pulsed laser systems as 
delay devices; 

• inventory macro-anomaly recog- 
nition; 

• application of presence and/or 
point sensing and advanced object 



Figure 2. 

An artist’s concept of the Mobile Detection Assessment Response System (MDARS) 
deployment in a weapon storage site. 


6 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 




BARRIER APPLICATION SYSTEM-1 

(STICKY FOAM DISPENSING SYSTEM) 


Figure 3. 

The basic component of the Barrier Application System-1, “sticky foam” is a commer- 
cially available product which is kept in a pressurized vessel and can be expanded 
into a mass 34 times its pressurized volume. 


recognition technology to identify 
human intruders; 

• advanced tagged material detec- 
tion/position locator; 

• platter charge and air-intrusion 
countermeasure systems; and 

• applications of digital signal pro- 
cessing, ultrasonic pulses, artificial 
neural network technology and cover, 
concealment and deception to enhance 
physical security, etc. 

It is anticipated that these tech- 
nologies, when they mature during 
the late 1990s or early 2000s, will 
remedy the present vulnerabilities of 
our physical security systems against 
ever-increasing threats. 

DOD Security Operational 
Test Site (SOTS) 

This unique facility is totally 
dedicated to the test and evaluation of 
security systems, concepts and doctrine 
in a realistic environment. Located in a 
remote 130-acre maneuver area 12 miles 
away from the Fort McClellan canton- 
ment, the DOD SOTS is the only facili- 
ty available for the military services to 
determine how well PSE can stop or 
delay a ground or airborne attack using 
real weapons and explosives against our 
most sensitive facilities. Initially built by 
DNA in 1983 to support all services, the 
DOD SOTS consists of: 


• a complete special weapons storage 
facility which includes NATO standard 
fencing/lighting, a site security control 
center, a maintenance and assembly 
building, two earth-covered storage 
bunkers, a free-standing headwall for 
blast test, and two towers; 

• an operations building for on-site 
administrative support personnel and 
staff; and 

• an extensive network of under- 
ground conduit and fiber optic data link 
for remote data collection. 

DOD SOTS is unique because of its 
availability of the replica of a fully- 
operational small nuclear storage site, 
and its capability to conduct live-fire 
testing, and the ability to close access 
to direct view for classified testing. In 
October 1985, DNA transferred DOD 
SOTS to the Army and, since then, it has 
been operated by the U.S. Army Military 
Police School with Training and Doc- 
trine Command (TRADOC) oversight. 

Even though the importance of DOD 
SOTS to the PSE RDA mission is without 
question, it was not immune from the 
effects of the ongoing budget reduc- 
tions. Current fiscal realities forced 
TRADOC, whose primary mission does 
not include test and evaluation, to lower 
the DOD SOTS resourcing package to 
the bottom of their priorities. Conse- 
quently, it remained unfunded and fac- 
ed potential shut down by the fall of 


1991. Alarmed at this, the APSEAG 
sought and obtained resource com- 
mitments from DOD PSE Action Group 
for the continued operation of this 
facility. Actions are underway to transfer 
the oversight responsibility of the DOD 
SOTS from TRADOC to AMC. 

Future Actions 

The APSEAG plans to meet at least 
quarterly to build a consensus on Army 
PSE issues. The overall objective is to 
continue efforts to ensure that quality 
PSE is acquired and made available to 
the Army user, consistent with the pro- 
gram thrusts outlined by MG Rigby. 


EMMANUEL J. NIDHIRY is the 
AMC system staff engineer respon- 
sible for physical security equip- 
ment. He has a bachelor 's degree in 
electrical engineering from India 
and a master's degree in business 
administration from Fairleigh 
Dickinson University. 

LTC LARRY J. PETCU is the prod- 
uct manager for physical security 
equipment. He holds a B.S. degree 
from the U.S. Military Academy and 
an M.S. degree in nuclear engineer- 
ing from Georgia Institute of Tech- 
nology. He is a member of the Army 
Acquisition Corps. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 7 



TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER — 
IT’S THE LAW 


By James A. Ball 


Introduction 

To many in the military community, 
the term ‘technology transfer” con- 
jures up visions of military espionage 
that results in American technology 
winding up in the hands of our adver- 
saries. In the recent past, U.S. 
computer-assisted manufacturing 
technology has enabled the Soviet 
Navy to produce more silent submarine 
propellers. The Soviet space shuttle and 
front line Soviet aircraft bear a striking 
resemblance to our own; and the Ira- 
qis almost got away with buying new 
high-tech furnaces that they intended 
to use to make nuclear weapon devices. 
But this was not the kind of technology 
transfer on the minds of laboratory 
directors and their legal and technical 
staff, who assembled recently in 
Washington, DC, for the Army’s first 
Domestic Technology Transfer Con- 
ference. The topic of concern was how 
to better move technology developed 
in Army programs and laboratories to 
the commercial marketplace, thus us- 
ing Army technology to benefit the 
American economy and enhance our 
international competitiveness. 

For more than 10 years, the Congress 
has become increasingly concerned 
about our loss of leadership in 
technology areas, especially when so 
much of our national budget goes for 
R&D. Of special concern is the 
technology which comes from the 
military share of R&D (over 60 percent) 
which has applications to commercial 
products, but is perceived as difficult 


for the commercial sector to access. 

Because of these concerns, Congress 
has passed several pieces of legislation 
to make it the mission of all federal 
laboratories to find ways to transfer 
their technologies to the private sector 
for commercial purposes. Principal 
among these laws is the Stevenson- 
Wydler Act of 1980, which was “beef- 
ed up” by the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986 and subsequent 
legislation. The bottom line to all of this 
is that technology transfer is now “the 
law” for federal R&D activities; not a 
punitive law, but rather one that will 
benefit the R&D community, the Army, 
and the nation. 

Because technology transfer is now 
the law, the Army has moved forward 
to incorporate all of the many respon- 
sibilities, policies, legal implications, 
and procedures into a newly issued 
regulation (AR 70-57). The Army 
Domestic Technology Transfer Con- 
ference was triggered by the release of 
this regulation. Cliff Lanham, Army 
program manager for domestic tech- 
nology transfer, served as the principal 
host. The conference objective was to 
provide a uniform concept of the 
Army’s response to Congressional 
legislation and to review proactive Ar- 
my policy on these issues. 

Army Technology Transfer 
Policy 

The first day of the conference was 
devoted to an overview of technology 
transfer policy, its legal ramifications, 


and the mission of Army laboratories. 
Army laboratory directors were expos- 
ed to a full spectrum of issues ranging 
from direct mission responsibilities and 
importance, to legal issues, re- 
quirements, and procedures. 

Bruce M. Fonoroff, deputy chief of 
staff for technology and management, 
U.S. Army Materiel Command, opened 
the conference with welcoming com- 
ments. He emphasized the importance 
of technology transfer to both the Ar- 
my mission as well as the national 
economy. Dr. Daphne Kamely, director 
for research and laboratory manage- 
ment, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of the Army (Research, Development 
and Acquisition) delivered the keynote 
address. She maintained that military 
technological preeminence must be 
coupled with contributions of fed- 
erally-funded science and technology 
to the successful commercialization of 
new products. 

The Congressional viewpoint was 
provided by James Turner, staff direc- 
tor, Subcommittee on Technology and 
Competitiveness, U.S. House of 
Representatives. Turner discussed Con- 
gressional concerns for domestic 
technology transfer, and the need to 
implement the technology transfer 
statutes as a way to shield against 
foreign competitors commercializing 
federally-funded technology before 
American companies. According to 
Turner, Congress has the federal 
laboratories under a microscope with 
respect to funding vs. productivity and, 


8 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 



TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
IT’S THE LAW! 


while support for technology transfer 
must come from the top levels of 
government, the real work lies with the 
laboratory personnel supported by 
their laboratory directors. 

Dr. Loren C. Schmid, chairman of the 
Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC), 
presented an overview of the FLC’s 
background, functions, and mission. 
He stressed the importance of coopera- 
tion and networking among the Army 
Office of Research and Technology Ap- 
plications (ORTAs) and other FLC 
members to promote and facilitate 
technology transfer. 

The assistant secretary for tech- 
nology policy, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, provided the first day 
luncheon address. Deborah Wince- 
Smith’s remarks clearly focused on the 
challenge of improving our ability to 
use the assets of knowledge and 
technology that reside within our 
federal labs. She stated that if we can ef- 
fectively use these assets, we will be 
able to maintain our national com- 
petitiveness. Her comments supported 


the fact that, according to recent 
studies by the White House and the 
Department of Commerce, military 
technologies are vitally important to 
the future economic growth of the na- 
tion. She stressed the concept of ‘ ‘con- 
current utilization’ ’ of new technology 
in parallel applications which can help 
speed the commercialization process 
and emphasized the important role that 
the laboratories could have in this 
process. 

Anthony T. Lane, intellectual proper- 
ty counsel of the Army, Office of the 
Judge Advocate General, gave an over- 
view of new authorities and legal issues 
of technology transfer that reside in the 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986. He 
stressed that laboratory directors must 
see that ORTAs become a full-time, 
priority activity at each laboratory. He 
also said that maintaining the difficult 
balance between the main mission and 
technology transfer mission will be a 
major challenge for laboratory man- 
agers, but one that must be met. 

The first day’s formal sessions con- 


cluded with an executive overview of 
the job of the laboratory ORTAs. The 
overview provided the laboratory 
directors with a full view of the difficul- 
ty of the job and the need for their full 
support. The day concluded with Lucy 
Reilly, senior staff reporter for 
Washington Technology who spoke at 
dinner about federal laboratory 
technology transfer, industry and com- 
petitiveness. 

New Authorities and 
Legal Issues 

The second day of the conference 
focused on intellectual property and 
legal issues of technology transfer. Saul 
Elbaum, assistant command counsel 
for intellectual property law, U.S. Army 
Materiel Command, discussed Intellec- 
tual Property and How It Is Protected. 
He addressed the right to exclusivity 
and the stringent requirements for ade- 
quate descriptions of new technology. 
He also discussed the aspects of in- 
tellectual property applicable to 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 9 


technology transfer, including 
trademarks, copyrights, and patents 
and the distinctions among them. 

The key provisions of the Tech- 
nology Transfer Act of 1986 and its new 
authorities were explained by Earl T. 
Reichert, deputy division chief, In- 
tellectual Property Law Division, Of- 
fice of The Judge Advocate General. His 
presentation left no doubt that 
technology transfer responsibilities of 
R&D activities are well established in 
the law. 

Troublesome issues on conflict of in- 
terest were addressed by MAJ Murray B. 
Baxter, intellectual property attorney, 
Intellectual Property Law Division, Of- 
fice of the Judge Advocate General. 
Conflict of interest issues involved in 
technology transfer include participa- 
tion of inventors in negotiations, struc- 
tures of small corporations involving 
the inventors, inside information issues 
and dealing with technology brokers. 
Baxter made it clear that there were 
rewards for successful transfer, but the 
process had to be “squeaky clean.” 

Michael Zelenka, chief, Intellectual 
Property Law Division, U.S. Army 
Communications-Electronics Com- 
mand Legal Office, spoke about Licens- 
ing, including grant requirements, 
export control, and infringement. His 
presentation touched on the problems 
of providing enough information to 
facilitate domestic technology transfer 
while inhibiting the flow of militarily 
critical technology offshore. This is a 
difficult act to balance, yet there are 
mechanisms in place that make this 
process easier than most realize. 

Cooperative Research and Develop- 
ment Agreements or CRDAs are a ma- 
jor element of the new technology 
transfer regulation, and were discuss- 
ed by Kathy A. Kurke, assistant chief 
counsel for research and development, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Kurke 
examined CRDAs partnerships, the pur- 
pose of CRDAs, the legislation that 
shaped them, and the regulations 
affecting them. Her presentation was 
followed by a panel of four government 
representatives who provided the au- 
dience with details of their experience 
with CRDAs and the knowledge gained 
in developing and implementing them. 
Closing out day two was Barry G. Ber- 
inger, Republican general counsel, 
Committee on Science, Space and 
Technology, U.S. House of Repre- 
sentatives, who spoke at dinner 


on Changes in Copyright Law - Legal 
and Political Lssues. The second ses- 
sion clearly demonstrated the need for 
a close working relationship between 
the ORTAs managers and their legal 
counsel in managing technology trans- 
fer actions. 

The Job of the ORTAs 

The third and final day of the con- 
ference was devoted to the ORTAs 
managers and their difficult job of 
fostering technology transfer in an en- 
vironment that may not initially be 
receptive to the task. Cliff Lanham 
defined the mission of ORTAs managers 
by exploring and examining such issues 
as technology identification and assess- 
ment; managing the internal laboratory 
process and motivating laboratory per- 
sonnel; publicizing availability of new 
technology through outreach resources 
such as state, local, and professional 
networks; understanding the commer- 
cialization process; and providing 
technical assistance to entrepreneurs. 

The role of state and local economic 
development organizations as a vital 
element in the technology transfer in- 
frastructure was discussed by Dr. Walter 
Plosila, president, Suburban Maryland 
High Technology Council. State and 
local organizations of this type play a 
key role in effective two-way com- 
munication with the nation’s small 
businesses and entrepreneurs and must 
be a part of any successful technology 
transfer program. 

The conference concluded in an 
upbeat mode, with a summary of prog- 
ress and a charge that all Army R&D 
personnel must make technology trans- 
fer a conscious part of their daily 
activities. In the past four years, the 
Army has accomplished nearly 100 
CRDAs and has a dozen new licensing 
agreements on new technology with 
many more in process. The new laws 
and regulations will most surely con- 
tribute to successful technology 
transfers; creating new products and 
processes, royalties to inventors and 
laboratories, and a positive impact on 
jobs and economic growth. 

New Priorities 

As the dust settles from Desert 
Storm, new priorities are emerging for 
America and one of the sectors most af- 
fected could be military R&D. The 
linkages between military R&D and the 


commercial sector needs are well 
established. A recent White House 
report on critical technology has made 
it clear that military strength clearly 
depends on the health of the nation’s 
commercial industries, and that com- 
petitiveness and national security are 
intertwined through their mutual need 
for “dual use” technologies. 

At no time in the past has it been any 
more propitious to turn our national at- 
tention to maintaining a strong 
technology base in the interest of na- 
tional security as well as national 
economic strength. A major factor in 
this effort is the leverage of technology 
from military laboratories to commer- 
cial applications, and that is what the 
Army Domestic Technology Transfer 
program is all about. Technology 
transfer — it’s not only the law, it’s the 
future. 


JAMES A. BALL is the senior pro- 
gram manager for technology 
development with Systems 
Engineering and Management 
Associates , Inc. A retired Air Force 
colonel, with bachelor's and 
master's degrees in aerospace and 
mechanical engineering, he has ex- 
tensive experience in R&D and 
technology > transfer. He is the former 
director of technology applications 
for the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization. 


10 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


The Army and its inventors are star- 
ting to reap rewards as a result of the 
1986 Technology Transfer Act. A 
government inventor recently received 
a cheek for 110,000 as his portion of 
initial licensing fees paid for his inven- 
tion under the act. The subject inven- 
tion, a “Dual Mode Quartz Thermo- 
metric Sensing Device,” is expected to 
generate substantial royalties for the in- 
ventor, Stanley Schodowski, and the 
Electronics Technology and Devices 
Laboratory (ETDL), U.S. Army Lab- 
oratory Command, with licenses being 
held by three major corporations and 
four small businesses. 

Schodowski’s invention provides 
more than an order of magnitude im- 
provement in frequency stability that is 
crucial for low-power, high accuracy 
timekeeping and frequency control ap- 
plications. It has wide-ranging com- 
mercial applications such as in 
communications (satellite, cellular 
phones and pagers); navigation (Global 
Positioning System); telecommunica- 
tions (digital), and highly accurate 
digital thermometers. Schodowski was 
also selected for the New Jersey Inven- 
tor of the Year Award and inducted in- 
to the New Jersey Inventor Hall of Fame 
for the invention of his dual mode 
sensor. 

Under the guidelines of the Tech- 
nology Transfer Act, as implemented by 
the Department of Defense (DOD), an 
inventor receives 20 percent of licens- 
ing fees and royalties, up to the sum of 
$100,000 annually, with the laboratory 
where the invention was conceived 
receiving the remainder. Licensing in- 
come is used to further the laboratory’s 
technology transfer program and to 
reward top scientists and engineers. 

Government scientists and engineers 
who generate patents related to their 
work assign the rights to their patents 
over to the government. Prior to the 
Technology Transfer Act, the only 
remuneration received was $100.00 
upon invention disclosure and $300.00 
upon patent issuance. Today, these fees 
have increased to $300.00 and $500.00 
respectively. Potentially millions of 
dollars in patent royalties and fees were 
lost by the government and its inven- 
tors prior to the act. 

ETDL is in the process of negotiating 
patent license agreements for the 
Planar Doped Barrier (PDB) Semicon- 
ductor Device which could provide 
licensing fees and royalties income to 


ETDL 

INVENTOR 

RECEIVES 

$10,000 

FROM 

PATENT 

FEES 


By Carol A. Widmaier 


the inventor and to the laboratory. This 
device, a major advance in solid-state 
device technology, was invented at 
ETDL by Roger J. Malik, a former ETDL 
employee. It was modeled and 
fabricated in ETDL’s molecular beam 
epitaxy and fabrication facility and has 
led to several new solid-state devices for 
millimeter- wave radar and communica- 
tion components and systems. 

ETDL has been aggressively market- 
ing its patents, and under the direction 
of Richard Stern, ETDL’s technology 
transfer and small business manager, 
has developed and implemented a 
variety of marketing plans including 
advertisement in the Federal Register 
and direct mail. As a result, the 


laboratory has received $36,000 in 
licensing fees to date, and is negotiating 
several additional licenses. 

ETDL has taken the lead in im- 
plementing the Technology Transfer 
Act and related guidance. This high 
technology research and development 
government laboratory is responsible 
for the development of 85 percent of 
the electronics in the U.S. Army’s 
military systems. ETDL is one of seven 
laboratories of the U.S. Army 
Laboratory Command, Adelphi, MD., 
and is located at Fort Monmouth, NJ. 

Under the dynamic leadership of Dr. 
C. G. Thornton, the laboratory direc- 
tor, this outstanding Army laboratory 
has set the pace for technology transfer, 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 11 


Protecting Your Invention 


In today’s fast paced technology 
race, it is more important than ever for 
scientists and engineers to maintain 
good laboratory notebooks, docu- 
ment their results, and file invention 
disclosures. This should all be follow- 
ed by a patent application, and 
publication within “one year.” 

When an inventor wants to protect 
his invention, whether for a new pro- 
cess, machine, manufacture or com- 
position of matter or to improve an 
old device or process, he is granted a 
utility patent. If a scientist or engineer 
believes he has a patentable item, he 
should immediately prepare an inven- 
tion disclosure form and meet with a 
government patent attorney. The at- 
torney reviews the documentation, 
helps search for prior patents, and ad- 
vises if the invention should be for- 
warded to the Invention Evaluation 
Committee. 

The next step is preparation of a pa- 
tent application which the attorney 
files with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office. From the date of 
the application, there is a “patent 


pending.” However, this provides no 
protection. When the Patent Office 
issues a patent, then and only then, is 
the invention protected. The patent 
application must be filed within one 
year of the first public disclosure 
(publication or presentation), sale or 
offer for sale of the invention. This 
procedure is unlike that used in Japan 
or Europe where public disclosure is 
an immediate statutory bar with no 
grace period. 

There are many reasons for inven- 
tors to protect their inventions, in- 
cluding credibility, potential financial 
gain, peer respect, and personal 
recognition. It also protects the 
government from law suits for in- 
fringement and generates income for 
our government laboratories. 

One has only to follow the Texas In- 
struments (TI) court fights over patent 
infringement to see how important fil- 
ing disclosure can be. According to 
their newsletter TekBriefs , TI would 
be showing huge losses if not for pa- 
tent royalties they are collecting from 
Japanese and American companies. 


due partly to a cultural change and its 
“open laboratories program” that has 
created a complementary environment 
for innovation. 

ETDL’s “open laboratories program” 
strongly encourages academic and in- 
dustrial personnel to engage in on-site 
cooperative efforts with ETDL scien- 
tists and engineers at ETDL’s Tech- 
nology Centers of Excellence. Up to 150 
students, professors and other scien- 
tists and engineers from academia and 
industry work part-time for the lab- 
oratory on projects of mutual interest. 
The laboratory, which has 170 scien- 
tists and engineers on staff, and pro- 
duces between 35 to 55 patents 
annually, (this is 20 percent of the 
patents produced by the total Army), 
has successfully negotiated eight patent 
licenses to date. 

The laboratory holds significant 
patents in the following technology 
areas: magnetics, ferrite devices, crystal 
oscillators, optical switches, nanoelec- 
tronics, batteries, displays, millimeter- 
wave photonics, surface acoustic wave 
(SAW) devices, and infrared (IR) 


detectors. 

The laboratory, in concert with other 
government laboratories and agencies, 
expects to continue to develop 
technological seed patents and transi- 
tion 30 to 50 new electron devices and 
military technologies each year into 
developmental systems. 

ETDL has been recognized national- 
ly for its initiative and leadership role 
in technology transfer as well as by the 
Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) 
and DOD. ETDL’s Richard Stern was 
selected as the 1991 FLC representative 
of the year from over 700 competing 
government laboratories, and has 
testified before the House Subcommit- 
tee on Science and Technology on 
ETDL’s innovative technology transfer 
techniques. ETDL was also cited in a 
Secretary of Commerce Report to the 
president and Congress for its im- 
plementation of the Technology 
Transfer Act. 

ETDL has also been successful in ef- 
fecting Cooperative Research Develop- 
ment Agreements with industry 
(CRDAs) and has legally negotiated 12 


CRDAs to date, with several more pend- 
ing. CRDAs are a new and innovative 
method of operation. Participants are 
able to leverage their manpower, 
facilities and financial resources by 
working together as a team to solve 
common technological problems. The 
government, industry and academia all 
benefit as the technology base grows 
and the technology is more effectively 
and efficiently transferred to the com- 
mercial sector. Many of the CRDAs are 
targeted at small businesses. 

The U.S. Government took a major 
step toward helping the U.S. regain its 
technical leadership position and the 
respect of the world-wide scientific 
community with passage of the 
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innova- 
tion Act of 1980, the follow-on 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 and 
the related executive order. These 
sweeping changes were necessary to 
meet the ever increasing, competitive 
global market, and to improve the 
economic, environmental and social 
well-being of the United States. 

The Technology Transfer Act en- 
courages cooperative efforts among 
academia, industry and federal lab- 
oratories. Included under this umbrella 
are Cooperative Research and Develop- 
ment Agreements, and the licensing 
of government-owned inventions 
through patent licensing agreements. 

According to Anthony T. Lane, In- 
tellectual Property Council of the 
Army, “The number of inventions from 
federal laboratories has increased by 68 
percent (since the Technology Transfer 
Act) with 3,619 disclosures in FY90 
alone.“ 

The act has created a WIN-WIN situa- 
tion for both the government 
laboratories and its patent holders. 


CAROL A. WIDMAIER is an in- 
formation specialist with the U.S. 
Army Electronics Technology and 
Devices Laboratory where she heads 
up the Plans, Publications and 
Presentations Branch of the Tech 
Plans and Programs Office. She 
holds a degree in communications 
and is currently pursuing an ad- 
vanced degree in journalism. 


12 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


ENVIRONMENTAL 
CLEAN-UP 
OF EXPLOSIVES 
CONTAMINATED SOILS 


By LTC Larry A. Sparks 
and MAJ Craig A. Myler 


Background 

The U.S. Army is now actively pur- 
suing ways to clean up explosives- 
contaminated soils in an effort to 
preclude any adverse impact on the en- 
vironment. Past solutions for the treat- 
ment of contaminated water from 
explosive processing operations did 
not address the problem of con- 
taminating underground aquifers, 
which are underground reservoirs of 


water used for drinking purposes. Pro- 
duction plants, load, assemble, and 
pack facilities and washout operations 
discharged explosives-laden waste 
streams to lagoons and settling basins, 
which contributed to current con- 
tamination problems. Over time, ex- 
plosives accumulated in these waste 
pits and eventually migrated into the 
groundwater. Only recently has the 
Army discovered the problems caused 


by these lagoons and settling basins. 

A major concern in accomplishing 
the Army’s clean-up mission is the cost 
of remediating the soil contamination 
at such sites. While incineration of the 
explosives-contaminated soils has been 
proven effective, it is also costly and not 
always readily acceptable to the public. 
One alternative to incineration of con- 
taminated soils is composting, which 
offers a potentially cheaper, more ac- 
ceptable method of clean-up. 

The concept for composting explo- 
sives-contaminated soils started as a 
project to investigate treatment of off- 
specification manufactured explosives. 
Studies sponsored by the Army in the 
mid-1970s demonstrated the ability to 
treat the explosives TNT, RDX and 
HMX. In the early 1980s, after identi- 
fying a need to treat explosives- 
contaminated soil, the U.S Army Toxic 
and Hazardous Materials Agency 
(USATHAMA), located at Aberdeen 
Proving Ground, MD, initiated research 
into ways to accomplish soil remedia- 
tion. Immediately, incineration was 
developed as a way to treat contami- 
nated soil. Other technologies were 
reviewed, but composting was selected 
to undergo continued testing, based 
largely on the work done with pure ex- 
plosives. 

Bench scale studies conducted in test 
tubes and flasks were followed by pilot- 
scale composting performed in large 
tanks. Success at the pilot-scale 
prompted a demonstration test of the 
technology. During demonstration 



Figure 1. 


Umatilla Depot Activity Explosives Washout Facility and Expiosives-Contaminated 
Lagoons. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 13 


testing, three percent soil by volume 
was mixed with horse manure, wood 
chips and horse feed then allowed to 
compost in static piles. Explosive 
degradation was extensive and tox- 
icological testing of the finished prod- 
uct indicated it was safe to replace on 
the land. The demonstration was suc- 
cessful as a proof-of-principle, but 
design of a full scale implementation re- 
quired additional operating infor- 
mation. 


Site Selection 

To acquire this information, an op- 
timization study was developed. The 
objective of the study was to establish 
operating parameters for a remedial ac- 
tion using composting to treat 
explosives-contaminated soils. Since 
explosives-contaminated sites are not 
restricted to a particular climate, the 
optimization study had to reflect opera- 
tions under severe climatic conditions 
to establish the operability of systems 
at any location. Umatilla Depot Activi- 
ty (UMDA) in Hermiston, OR, was the 
site selected for the study. 

In the 1960s, a facility for recovering 
explosives from unserviceable muni- 
tions was operated at UMDA (Figure 1). 
Steam was used to melt explosives out 
of munition bodies, and upon cooling, 
the explosives were substantially 
recovered for reuse or for sale. Large 
quantities of water were used in this 
operation and when contacted with the 
explosives, the water became con- 
taminated. The contaminated water 
was discharged into two settling basins. 
Explosives contained in these waters 
consisted of TNT, RDX and HMX. Con- 
tamination levels currently approach 
10 percent in some areas of the two set- 
tling basins. Explosives have migrated 
50 feet downward to the water table 
and pose a potential threat to the en- 
vironment. The site was placed on the 
EPA’s National Priorities List in 1987. 

UMDA experiences temperatures be- 
tween 115 degrees and -25 degrees 
Fahrenheit, has an average annual rain- 
fall of 9 inches, and is subject to very 
high winds. These conditions are most 
detrimental, because composting re- 
quires biologically generated heat and 
high moisture at all times. Unprotected 
compost piles are subject to dispersion 
by wind. The optimization had to ac- 
count for this harsh climate. 




Figure 3. 

Pilot Scale Mechanical Composter. 


14 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 



Figure 4. 

Composting Optimization Study Static Pile Computer Data Acquisition and Control 
System. 


Optimization Study 

To conduct testing, the parameters to 
he studied had to be selected. Cost 
analysis demonstrated that the two 
most significant parameters for com- 
posting explosives contaminated soil 
were the rate at which explosives were 
metabilized and the amount of con- 
taminated soil in the compost mixture. 
Initial tests were designed to establish 
operating limits for these two param- 
eters as well as to obtain operating data 
pertinent to full scale design. 

Since bench scale testing could not 
be directly applied to full-scale opera- 
tions and full-scale testing was cost pro- 
hibitive, a pilot scale test was selected. 

Two separate types of composting 
were used to investigate a broad range 
of conditions. Aerated static piles were 
used to determine the maximum possi- 
ble soil loading. The simple design of 
static piles allowed multiple systems to 
be operated concurrently (Figure 2). To 
conduct kinetic rate optimization 
studies, a specially fabricated 
mechanical composter was acquired 
(Figure 3). Composts containing up to 
40 percent soil by volume were used to 
determine the rate of explosives 
degradation, the temperature profiles 
within each system, the moisture con- 
tent, pH, oxygen level and water con- 
sumption. 

A computer-based data acquisition 
and control system was used to regulate 
the reactions in each of the eight com- 
post systems. The computer auto- 
matically sampled temperature, 
oxygen, and moisture levels and 
recorded the data electronically. A 
schematic of the computer control 
system is shown in Figure 4. 

Implementing the 
Technology 

Results from the optimization study 
at UMDA are being used to develop a 
design for full scale remediation at 
UMDA. Half lives of less than 10 days 
in the well-mixed systems indicate 
economic viability at the 20 percent 
soil loading. Other environmental fac- 
tors such as moisture and temperature 
control are still being evaluated but 
pose no special difficulty in designing 
a full scale treatment system for UMDA. 

The decision to use composting for 
full scale remediation is expected in 
1991 This implementation will be the 
first full-scale application of biotech- 


nology for the treatment of explosives 
contaminated soils. 

Conclusion 

Results indicate that composting can 
be a cost effective alternative to in- 
cineration for remediation of 
explosives-contaminated soils, even 
under the harshest conditions. 
Estimates of Army-owned explosives 
contaminated sites indicate the poten- 
tial for several million tons of con- 
taminated soil requiring treatment. In 
addition to treating explosives- 
contaminated soils, the Army is 
prompting increased development by 
the private sector in using composting 
as a means to treat hazardous wastes. 
Composting of explosives is one pro- 
gram which maintains the Army as a 
leader in environmental action through 
improved technology while reducing 
the burden on installation restoration 
resources. 


LTCLARRYA. SPARKS is the com- 
mander of Umatilla Depot Activity 
in Hermiston, OR. He holds a 
bachelor ’s degree in chemistry from 
Ohio University and a master's 
degree in logistics management 
from the Florida Institute of 
Technology. He is a resident 
graduate of the Command and 
General Staff College. 

MAJ CRAIG A. MYLER is a 
chemical engineer and recently 
worked in the Research and 
Technology > Development Branch of 
the U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous 
Materials Agency at Aberdeen Prov- 
ing Ground, MD. He is currently 
assigned to the chemistry depart- 
ment, U.S. Army Military Academy, 
West Point, NY. He has a bachelor 's 
degree in chemistry from the 
Virginia Military Institute and 
master's and doctorate degrees in 
chemical engineering from the 
University of Pittsburgh. MAf Myler 
is a member of the Army Acquisition 
Corps. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 15 


THE ARMY CENTER 
OF EXCELLENCE 
FOR 

ADVANCED PROPULSION 
SYSTEMS RESEARCH 


Introduction 

The Army has hundreds of 
thousands of vehicles driven by diesel 
engines. In addition, there are approx- 
imately 150,000 generator sets, some 
diesel and some gasoline. Gasoline is 
being replaced by diesel because, in the 
European theater, all Army engines 
must be capable of using JP-8 as a fuel. 

Tactical vehicles use commercial 
diesel engines but combat vehicle 
engines are typically developed for a 
special application. Engine power den- 
sity is a major factor in vehicle design, 
especially for combat vehicles. Further- 
more, in combat, the ability of an 
engine to use any available fuel is a 
desirable attribute. Thus, the availabili- 
ty of compact, high power density, fuel 
efficient and fuel tolerant engines, both 
on commercial and on a specialized 
basis, is crucial to the Army. 

In order to provide the basic infor- 
mation needed to develop such 
engines, as well as to provide trained 
manpower for industrial and Army 
laboratories, the Army decided to 
establish a center for advanced propul- 
sion systems research. One of the Army 
centers supported by the DOD Univer- 
sity Research Initiative, The Center of 
Excellence for Advanced Propulsion 
Systems was, after national competi- 
tion, established at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison in 1986. 

The center at Madison is a continua- 
tion and consequence of engine 
research at Wisconsin which has been 
ongoing since construction of the 


By Dr. Gary Borman, 
Dr. Phil Myers and 
Dr. David Mann 


Mechanical Engineering Building in the 
1930s. Prior to World War II, Professors 
G.C. Wilson and R.A. Rose pioneered 
work on pressure pickups and diesel 
fuel additives to reduce ignition delay. 

During World War II, Phil Myers in 
the Department of Mechanical 
Engineering and Otto Uyehara in the 
Department of Chemical Engineering 
developed instrumentation capable of 
measuring the rapidly varying combus- 
tion temperatures in diesel engines. 

During the two decades following 
World War II, research on engines was 
conducted by a total of some 100 
graduate students in a “temporary” 
building, T-25. In 1969, the research 
moved to expanded facilities in the 
newly-constructed Engineering Re- 
search Building. These are the facilities 
used by the center. In 1964 Gary Bor- 
man, the director of the Engine 
Research Center (ERC), joined the facul- 
ty. Today, 13 faculty members and their 
associated 35 to 40 graduate students 
participate in the ERC. 

With core funding provided by the 
Army Center of Excellence, the ERC has 
grown through the continuation and 
expansion of many of the research pro- 
jects under way at the time the center 
was established. Funding for these ef- 


forts has come from other Army and 
government agencies. General Motors, 
Chevron, Mercury Marine, Intevep S.A. 
Venezuela, Komatsu, Chung Chen In- 
stitute of Technology, KIA Motors, and 
Outboard Marine have provided partial 
support typically in the form of student 
stipends or fellowships. Cummins, 
Ford, General Motors and Navistar have 
donated equipment. Cray Research and 
the San Diego Super Computer Center 
have supplied valuable computer time. 

Program Objectives 

To help meet Army needs, the center 
has three primary objectives. The first 
is to develop and systematize informa- 
tion on basic processes that occur in 
engines so this information can be used 
during engine design to rapidly pro- 
duce more compact power systems. 
Obtaining this basic information on 
engine processes is difficult because the 
phenomena being studied cover wide 
ranges of pressure and temperature, oc- 
cur in milliseconds, and are encased in 
thick, high-pressure containers (engine 
cylinders) penetrated only by the 
various mechanisms essential for 
engine operation. Because of these fac- 
tors, lasers and optical diagnostics, 
essential to obtaining needed ex- 
perimental information, require special 
techniques when applied to practical 
engines. At the same time, the develop- 
ment of super computers permits more 
sophisticated simulation programs 
which, when modified and validated 


16 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 



Crank Angle (Degrees) 


Figure 1. 

Oil Film Thickness for Ring 1 Near Top Center. The upper solid line represents the ring-wall 
clearance. The lower traces are measured film thickness: The solid line is the average of 
20 cycles, while broken lines are maximum and minimum values. 


by experimental data, should help to 
speed up the engine design process. 

The second objective is to provide 
trained employees, knowledgeable 
about engines, for government, in- 
dustry and universities. There is 
evidence that the most effective 
transfer of technology from university 
research labs occurs through the 
employment of graduates, trained in 
the latest approaches and techniques, 
by government and industry. Army 
laboratories must have personnel who 
understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of new design tools and the 
way they can be used to obtain more 
compact power systems for Army 
vehicles. Industry must have 
knowledgeable personnel to use, dur- 
ing the engine design process, new 
diagnostic instruments, and soph- 
isticated simulation codes. 

The third objective is to ensure the 
availability, when needed, of a reser- 
voir of persons who can advise and 
assist the Army in making judgmental 
decisions regarding future engines and 
vehicles. This is achieved through the 
exposure of the center faculty to the 
performance demands of Army engines 
and the exposure of Army personnel to 
the latest tools and findings in engine 
research. Through the combination of 
such exposure, plus the basic research 
projects, the center’s faculty expands 


its expertise and becomes a valuable 
resource for consultation on Army 
problems. 

Developing Basic 
Information 

Research projects conducted by the 
center cover such diverse topics as in- 
cylinder modeling, engine combus- 
tion, fuels and emissions, in-cylinder 
and heat exchanger heat transfer, spray 
dynamics, lubrication, materials, and 
design. Results of this research are 
available to the general technical public 
through professional society presenta- 
tions and publications, through special 
workshops at Madison, and through 
visits to Army labs. Since it is impossi- 
ble to describe all of these projects in 
detail, only two projects, cold starting 
and cylinder lubrication, are discussed 
to illustrate center activities. 

Cold Starting. Engines in Army 
vehicles are required to operate under 
arctic as well as desert conditions. 
Diesel engines are difficult to start at 
low temperatures when it becomes 
hard to reach the high in-cylinder 
temperatures and pressures necessary 
for autoignition of the fuel during 
cranking. Special starting kits, which 
are bulky, are currently fitted to diesel 
engines to assure starting at temper- 
atures below -10 C. Any approach that 


can lower the unaided starting 
temperature, and reduce the need for 
the starting kits, would be of great 
benefit. Consequently, the ERC has 
conducted analytical studies of cold 
starting in an attempt to determine the 
controlling factors during cold start. 
Two different analytical approaches 
were used. The first was thermo- 
dynamic cycle analysis and the second 
was three dimensional, multiphase, 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) 
calculations of in-cylinder gas and fuel 
spray properties during and following 
fuel injection. 

Four different strategies to reach 
higher peak, mass-averaged cylinder 
temperatures were studied. These 
were: heating of coolant to increase in- 
take manifold and cylinder metal 
temperature; increased cranking speed; 
inlet air heating; and using the “filling” 
process to produce higher gas 
temperature at the start of compres- 
sion. A combination of the last three 
items seemed to be the most effective 
approach. 

The most significant finding of the 
study was that low fuel vaporization 
rates seem to be responsible for the 
failure to achieve starting. However, the 
contribution of normal changes in fuel 
volatility to fuel vapor concentration is 
small. The study confirmed that fuel 
mass reaches the crevice regions dur- 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 17 


ing cold starting, adding to the fuel 
amount in the chamber for successive 
cycles. Also, the high blow-by at low 
cranking speeds reduces the peak 
temperature of the cycle and removes 
fuel from the combustion chamber. An 
important future task is to use the 
modeling to improve understanding of 
experimental cold starting data (being 
obtained at Wayne State University 
under TACOM and ARO sponsorship). 

Cylinder Lubrication. Cylinder 
friction accounts for about 40 percent 
of total engine friction. Low heat rejec- 
tion engines, which are of interest to 
the Army because of potential reduc- 
tions in power system volume, have 
higher cylinder wall temperatures 
which decrease the viscosity and in- 
crease the consumption of the lubri- 
cant. Oil control is of increasing interest 
in meeting low particulate exhaust 
emission standards. Thus, understand- 
ing cylinder lubrication phenomena is 
of design interest for both commercial 
and combat vehicle engines. 

Two different studies of lubrication 
were conducted at the ERC. The first 
study measured oil film thickness at top 
ring reversal location using three 
0.64mm diameter capacitance probes. 
The probes were separated by 120 
degrees. The study also measured heat 
transfer using three surface thermo- 
couples located adjacent to the capaci- 
tance probes. A later study used a 50 
micron fiber optic to guide laser light 
through the liner to the oil film. The 
laser light caused the oil to fluoresce at 
a different wavelength than the laser 
with an intensity related to the volume 
of oil fluorescing. Thus, the intensity 
of the light returning through the fiber 
is a measure of the oil film thickness. 

The capacitance probes showed dif- 
ferences in thickness and variation of 
thickness of the oil film at the three dif- 
ferent locations. The oil film thickness 
was unexpectedly insensitive to normal 
changes in oil viscosity, cylinder 
pressure and engine rpm. However, 
there was a considerable change in film 
thickness over a single cycle, with the 
oil film thickness much larger on the 
exhaust stroke than the compression 
stroke. This may provide a source of 
high oil-generated emissions. 

Static tests using the oil fluorescence 
technique showed that temperature 
and additive packages affect fluo- 
rescence. This indicates a need for an 


in-cylinder calibration. The fluo- 
rescence signal was linear with oil film 
thickness up to about 40 microns. The 
engine tests clearly show the passage 
of the ring pack and, in many cases, it 
was possible to discern both the pro- 
file and movement of the ring. Figure 
1 shows experimental data for ring 1 in 
the top center region under fired con- 
ditions. The upper solid line shows the 
ring- wall separation. The lower traces 
show the measured film thickness with 
the solid line representing the average 
of 20 cycles and the dashed lines the 
maximum and minimum values. Note 
that in the top center region the ring 
still covers the probe. The ring profile 
appears distorted because it is shown 
as a function of crankangle, not of time 
or distance along the ring, and the 
velocity of the ring varies. Also note 
that the bottom profile of the ring ap- 
pears in the top center region while the 
top profile appears at earlier and later 
crankangles. 

Analyzing only the data repeated 
from cycle to cycle, the trends ob- 
served on a motored engine with the 
head removed did not follow trends 
predicted by theory. The trends with 
speed followed theory in the fired 
engine, but other data showed abnor- 
mal behavior. The unique data ob- 
tained in this study will guide the 
development of reliable models for the 
analysis of engine lubrication, leading 
to improved engine reliability and 
durability. 

Providing Trained Personnel 

Center support for training of 
graduate students came in the form of 
research assistantships and a separate 
graduate fellowship program. Both 
have been essential in recruiting and 
training students. The graduate 
fellowship program was especially 
helpful in recruiting top U.S. Ph.D. can- 
didate students for the program by pro- 
viding a competitive stipend with a 
three year guarantee of support. 

To date, 19 master’s degree (four of 
these continued on at Wisconsin 
towards the Ph D. degree) and 17 Ph.D. 
degree students have graduated from 
the program. Twenty-five of these 36 
students have gone to industry, one to 
government, and two to academic 
research. 

Via short visits, the faculty has in- 
creased considerably its understanding 


of the demands placed on Army 
engines. In addition, Army personnel 
exposed to center research have in- 
creased their understanding of advanc- 
ed instrumentation and simulation 
programs and how the results might be 
used to improve Army engines. A joint 
program with researchers at TACOM 
has been instituted to obtain two- 
dimensional maps of piston surface 
temperature. 

Technical Assistance 

When the Army makes decisions 
regarding new research, new 
developments, new engines, new pro- 
grams, etc., it is extremely helpful to 
have input from persons who under- 
stand both Army needs and potential 
future engine developments. The 
center’s program has helped to develop 
persons to fill this need. Center facul- 
ty members have made approximately 
40 trips to Army laboratories in connec- 
tion with this. They have also par- 
ticipated in the Board on Army Science 
and Technology and Strategic Tech- 
nologies for the Army study and served 
the Navy, NASA and DOE in a similar 
capacity. 

Summary 

The Army Center of Excellence for 
Advanced Propulsion Systems has pro- 
vided an infusion of personnel and 
equipment to solve basic engine system 
problems. The center has achieved this 
through training and the transfer of in- 
formation on engine research to engine 
designers and manufacturers. The Ar- 
my, the engine industry and the educa- 
tional system have all benefitted 
through the resulting increase in 
understanding between Army person- 
nel and center faculty. 


DR. GARY BORMAN is the direc- 
tor of the Engine Research Center 
DR. PHIL MYERS is the assistant 
director of the Engine Research 
Ce)iter. 

DR. DAVID MANN, who is with 
the Army Research Office, is 
technical monitor for the Center of 
Excellence for Advanced Pro- 
pulsion. 


18 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


IMPLEMENTING 
THE IN-PLANT 
QUALITY 
EVALUATION 
PROCESS 


According to the Secretary of 
Defense’s Defense Management Report 
to the President, July 1989, “a series of 
major studies since the Packard Com- 
mission have documented an alarming 
erosion in the U.S. defense industrial 
base, including: a decline in the total 
number of defense suppliers; ac- 
celerating import penetration and 
growing dependency on foreign 
sources for vital components and 
subassemblies; and decreasing returns 
on fixed assets, declining capital in- 
vestments, and lagging productivity in 
key defense sectors.” These trends over 
the long term will significantly affect 
our national security readiness. To 
combat this situation, commanders in 
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
decided to adopt Total Quality Manage- 
ment (TQM). 

TQM principles include stimulating 
innovation and reducing variation of 
processes in the defense industry. The 
government quality section’s new 
system to promote these changes is In- 
Plant Quality Evaluation (IQUE). 

Defense industrialists, DLA senior 
executives, and military officers with 
procurement specialties will have an in- 
terest in the implementation of IQUE. 

Beginning in January 1990, senior of- 
ficials at the DLA directed the initiation 
of classes to train personnel on the pro- 
cedures of this new system. To what 
degree have the Quality Assurance 
Representatives (QARs) at a Defense 
Plant Representative Office (DPRO) im- 
plemented IQUE and is the government 
achieving its objectives? This article in- 
cludes a retrospective analysis of 
whether the goals of IQUE are material- 
izing. Also, there is a discussion on the 
events that preceded IQUE implemen- 
tation (old system), the DPRO missions, 
a discussion of IQUE foundations, and 
an analysis of factors associated with 
the implementation of IQUE. These 
factors include contractor and DPRO 
teamwork, openness, flexibilities of the 
DPRO, resistance to change, job securi- 
ty, and quality section tools. 

Old System 

To ensure that DOD funds of more 
than seven hundred billion dollars were 
effectively spent, the government 
previously used Contractor Quality 
Assurance Program (CQAP) methods. 
These methods focused on the stand- 
ard American industry principles of 


By CPT William J. Belknap 


production and discipline. Specific in- 
struments used by the government 
were product inspection at rigid inter- 
vals, emphasis on telling the contrac- 
tor how to conduct processes, and 
actions in a policeman’s role. 

Looking at the success of Japanese in- 
dustry, the DLA understood that the old 
way of administering defense contracts 
was not conducive to promoting inter- 
nationally competitive organizations 
nor the principles of TQM. Before 
discussing what has changed, it is 
helpful to describe briefly the missions 
and structure of the DPRO. 

DPRO Missions 

The DPRO is collocated with the 
contractor. Its major missions are en- 
suring that the contractor ships only 
quality products to the government, 
monitoring contractor performance to 
facilitate efficient operations, oversee- 
ing compliance with contract terms, 
and providing the best possible support 
to the program managers and procur- 
ing activities. 


The DPRO includes a contract sec- 
tion, a quality section and an engineer 
section. IQUE implementation is the 
responsibility of the quality section. 
What follows is a synopsis of IQUE 
foundations. 

IQUE Foundations 

The foundations of IQUE are con- 
gruent with the major principles of 
TQM. Two of the most important are 
using statistical analysis to determine if 
processes are in control (a process is in 
control when, after statistical sampling, 
it conforms to the upper and lower 
control limits as agreed upon by the 
contractor and the government) and 
encouraging continuous improvement. 
The QAR achieves these goals through 
several methods. They include proof- 
ing contractor processes, conducting 
product audits, performing data collec- 
tion and analysis, and completing cor- 
rective action requests (CAR) and 
continuous improvement oppor- 
tunities (CIO). 

Proofing the adequacy of the process 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 19 


Greater 

motivation 

in 

supporting 
the 
tenets 
of IQUE 
and 
Improved 
Productivity 
would 
result 
from 
assuring 
the QARs 
that 
they 
have 
job 
security. 


includes determining how well the 
contractor blends inputs (people, 
machines, tooling, materials and 
methods) to achieve the desired out- 
come or product. 

Periodically, the QAR conducts prod- 
uct audits and performs detailed data 
analysis to ensure that the processes are 
still in control. This is done by various 
data collection means and then using 
statistical analysis for confirmation. 
Processes that are not in control are 
remedied by informing the contractor 
through corrective action requests. In 
addition, if any procedures can be im- 
proved, then the QAR submits a CIO to 
the contractor. These actions form the 
basis for IQUE. 

Contractor and DPRO 
Teamwork 

The goals of IQUE implementation 
are customer satisfaction, continuous 
process improvement, improved prod- 
uct quality, and reduced overall costs. 
Primary vehicles to achieve these goals 
are teamwork between the government 
and the contractor, flexibilities within 
contract administration, and the 
knowledge of whether processes are in 
control. This knowledge requires an 
openness by the contractor in pro- 
viding information for analysis to the 
government, trusting that the govern- 
ment will not use the information in a 
negative way. 

As Rosabeth E. Kanter, a professor at 
the Harvard Business School, purports 
in the Change Masters, both organiza- 
tions to achieve TQM goals must 
“reduce rancorous conflict and isola- 
tion between (them); and create 
mechanisms for exchange of informa- 
tion and new ideas across organiza- 
tional boundaries; and ensure that 
multiple perspectives will be taken in- 
to account in decisions; and provide 
coherence and direction.” What occurs 
is similarity of focus by both of the 
organizations. And, unit energies are 
not solely directed to protecting self in- 
terests. Instead, resources are more ef- 
ficiently used to improve joint quality 
goals. Besides improved quality, cost 
reduction is a major goal. 

Statistical Process Control 

To reduce costs in a product, there 
must be less time spent on reworking 
failed or flawed processes (thus reduc- 


ing labor costs), more efficient use of 
materials (thus requiring the contractor 
to purchase less), and devoting more 
time to improving the product (thus 
making the contractor more com- 
petitive and offering competitive 
prices). 

With statistical process control pro- 
cedures, the government and contrac- 
tor can jointly discover what is causing 
variations in the process and then seek 
ways to reduce the variations. These 
situations demand openness between 
both parties. Previously, the QAR was 
responsible for identifying non-con- 
forming materials and products and en- 
suring they were not delivered to the 
government. The contractor was on his 
own to correct the deficiencies. Now, 
with the advent of IQUE, the QAR is 
part of the solution. 

During a discussion with a software 
specialist at a major defense contractor, 
he stated “under the new system I can 
inform the QAR of many more of my 
problems and know he will assist in im- 
proving the process.” 

Although the contractor is still 
responsible for the end product, the 
QAR will facilitate correcting deficien- 
cies and exhibit more patience before 
elevating the deficiencies to senior level 
management. 

Another indicator of openness oc- 
curs with the transfer of information to 
the government. Data from some 
automated machines is fed directly in- 
to government offices. The govern- 
ment can now receive information on 
the performance of the machines the 
same time that company managers 
receive it. Two examples of this exist in 
a contractor’s plant in the northeastern 
United States. These two machines 
record data on thousands of processes 
and express the data on yield charts. 
One machine alone is responsible for 
producing over 5,000 antennae 
elements for the Patriot Radar System. 
With this information, the QAR spends 
less time inspecting end products 
because the machine conducts an in- 
spection and sends the information to 
government terminals automatically. 


Flexibility 

This openness leads directly into the 
subject of flexibility. Gone are the rigid 
schedules of inspection. Now, the QAR 
only conducts a product audit if a pro- 
cess is not in control. This again saves 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


Use of continuous improvement opportunities 
directly translates into conforming with one of 
the major tenets of IQUE— continuously improving processes 

and saving money. 


the contractor labor hours because he 
now spends little time preparing for in- 
spections. Fewer labor hours result in 
a less expensive price. Likewise, more 
capital can be spent on automation 
such as with an automatic inspection 
machine. This programmable machine 
inspects printed circuit boards at a rate 
10 times greater than what a human 
could accomplish. The machine is 
almost infallible. Process variation is 
reduced and a higher quality product 
is produced because there is less varia- 
tion between individual commodities. 
Furthermore, because rework is 
minimized, the products are produced 
at a lower cost. Simultaneously, the 
government is kept informed on the 
status of the process. 

Resistance to Change 

A factor hindering IQUE implemen- 
tation is resistance to change from ex- 
perienced QARs. QARs are still held 
accountable for the acceptance of the 
commodity. Some have relied on the 
inspection process for over 20 years. 
They know there will still be some 
(although minimal) variation in the 
products. The IQUE initiative has only 
been on-going for 20 months. Adapting 
to cultural changes requires time. Thus, 
it will probably take several years for 
these cultural barriers to breakdown. 
Job security is another issue affecting 
implementation. 

Job Security 

Some QARs believe they are con- 
tributing to the demise of their job. 
Other than the already-in-place tenure 
system, there has been little said about 
job security or promotions. This 
hinders the full implementation of 
IQUE. As Kanter explained, “When 
everything is highly uncertain ... it is 
difficult to invest in or to believe in 


change, or even to stop worrying long 
enough to have the extra energy it re- 
quires.’’ More information from DLA 
senior officials on job security would 
assist in this change process. 

Greater motivation in supporting the 
tenets of IQUE and improved produc- 
tivity would result from assuring the 
QARs that they have job security. 

QAR Tools 

Another significant facet of the im- 
plementation is the tools the QAR uses 
to induce the contractor to increase in- 
novation and productivity. These are 
corrective action requests (CARs), and 
continuous improvement opportun- 
ities (CIOs). The QAR uses CARs to 
motivate the contractor to keep pro- 
cesses under control. With a CAR, the 
contractor must indicate what action 
he will take to correct a deficiency. 

Many contractor actions were to in- 
spect more. These “solutions’’ 
however, were incongruent with TQM 
principles. Now when this occurs the 
government requires the contractor to 
identify what changes will occur to im- 
prove the flawed processes. This helps 
shift the contractor’s focus from con- 
ducting more inspections to achieving 
controlled processes with minimal 
variations. 

Another tool is the continuous im- 
provement opportunity, whereby the 
contractor is notified of an opportuni- 
ty to improve a process. The QAR for- 
wards it to the manager involved and 
to the plant manager. CIOs are not 
mandatory — the contractor may 
choose to adopt or disregard these sug- 
gestions. The government works more 
as a team member to improve the effi- 
ciency of the processes, not as a 
policeman diverting valuable time from 
the contractor. Use of continuous im- 
provement opportunities directly 
translates into conforming with one of 


the major tenets of IQUE-continuously 
improving processes and saving money. 

Conclusion 

Most Quality Assurance Represen- 
tatives fully support the tasks 
associated with the adoption of the 
program. There is much evidence to 
suggest that the new system of IQUE is 
motivating contractor results. These 
results include improving contractor 
processes, reducing costs, developing 
teamwork between the government 
and contractor and developing flex- 
ibilities allowing the QAR to conduct 
product audits when necessary. There 
are still some challenges to overcome. 
These include more education, defin- 
ing more succinctly what comprises a 
successful program and what needs to 
be improved, and providing greater job 
security. 

With the successful outcome of these 
challenges the reduction of variation 
and continuous improvement will pro- 
ceed at an even greater rate. 


CPT WILLIAM ]. BELKNAP is a 
primary contracting officer in the 
Directorate for Production and Pro- 
curement at the US. Army Tank- 
Automotive Command. He served 
previously as a Training With In- 
dustry student in the Defense Plant 
Representative Office, Raytheon, 
Burlington, MA, after completing 
assignments as an armor officer in 
the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Fort Stewart, GA. He is a 1981 
graduate of the U.S. Military 
Academy. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 21 


CHEMICAL 

WEAPONS 

TREATY 

VERIFICATION 


By Richard W. Hutchinson, 
Robert E. Lentz, 
and Stephen L. English 


Introduction 

In 1984, Vice President Bush in- 
troduced a draft Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) to the 40-nation 
Conference on Disarmament. This U.S. 
proposal supported a verifiable 
worldwide ban on the use, stockpiling 
and production of chemical weapons 
(CW). This document served as a 
baseline from which subsequent ver- 
sions of the CWC draft text have 
evolved. Negotiations continue to 
finalize the draft text. More recently, 
the U.S. entered bilateral negotiations 
with the USR. In June 1990, the coun- 
tries signed an agreement calling for the 
cessation of production and the 
destruction of existing stockpiles to a 
5,000-ton residual ceiling. 

Verification is a key U.S. concern for 
both the CWC and the U.S. -USSR 
bilateral agreements. U.S. negotiators 
need to know how and to what extent 
the CWC and bilateral agreements can 
be verified in order to produce CW 
agreements favorable to U.S. interests. 
The U.S. Army Chemical Research, 
Development and Engineering Center 
(CRDEC) has the technical lead within 
the Department of Army for CW trea- 
ty verification R&D, and is executing a 


major portion of the DOD CW treaty 
verification program. The Defense 
Nuclear Agency (DNA) is the executive 
agent for the overall DOD program. 

This article presents a discussion of 
the CW verification problem, the R&D 
program addressing the problem, and 
preliminary findings. 

CW Verification Problem 

The parameters of CWC verification 
have two main components: the first is 
the verification requirements and aims 
of the CWC, and the second is the 
technical and physical constraints 
within which those requirements must 
be applied. This article is limited to 
technical aspects, recognizing that 
political and national security con- 
siderations do and will have a major im- 
pact on the verification procedures 
ultimately implemented. 

The CWC requires the destruction of 
existing CW stockpiles and production 
facilities over a 10 year period, and pro- 
hibits CW developments, production, 
acquisition, stockpiling, assistance to 
others, and use. The CWC will establish 
a technical secretariat with a staff of in- 
ternational inspectors to perform 


verification inspections. 

The CWC identifies three schedules 
of chemicals and assigns different con- 
trol, reporting and verification 
measures to each schedule. Schedule 1 
chemicals include known CW agents, 
related compounds, binary agent com- 
ponents, and two toxins, ricin and sax- 
itoxin. It permits production of one 
metric ton per year of Schedule 1 
agents to support CW defense, medical, 
and other non-CW research. Schedule 
2 chemicals are precursors for produc- 
ing Schedule 1 agents. A majority of 
these are also produced commercially 
for purposes not associated with CW. 
Schedule 3 chemicals are industrial 
chemicals such as phosgene that might 
be used for CW purposes. These are 
called “dual use” chemicals. 

The CWC provides for verification 
activities for 10 situations or 
“scenarios” to ensure that the overall 
objectives are met. (Table 1). The first 
five verification scenarios in Table 1 
deal with declared CW facilities and 
stockpiles. The CWC requires that 
signatory nations declare their CW 
stockpiles and production facilities. 
The worldwide number of such 
facilities is thought to be less than 100. 


22 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


Thus, the scope of the verification 
problem for declared CW facilities is 
bounded by the relatively small number 
of facilities. 

Verification of permitted Schedule 1 
CW agent production is also limited in 
scope because each country can have 
only one declared facility that pro- 
duces up to one metric ton per year of 
agent. These quantities of agent are not 
considered militarily significant. 

Verification of the declared commer- 
cial production of Schedule 2 CW 
precursors and Schedule 3 dual-use 
chemicals must consider hundreds of 
commercial chemical plants operating 
within the U.S. and possible thousands 
operating worldwide. The CWC pro- 
vides for periodic inspection of 
Schedule 2 facilities and an annual pro- 
duction declaration for Schedule 3 pro- 
ducers. Since the production of 
Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals is allowed, 
the thrust of verification is to detect 


diversion of these chemicals into CW 
through records review. However, the 
ease with which records can be falsified 
is a critically limiting factor in consider- 
ing how effectively these scenarios can 
be verified. 

Scenario 9 involves the use of 
challenge inspections which in- 
vestigate possible noncompliance at 
“suspect sites.” Here lies the most dif- 
ficult verification problem of the CWC. 
Signatures of CW activities are very 
limited and a CW munition often looks 
identical to a high explosive round. A 
CW stockpile could be hidden under- 
ground or placed in a warehouse 
presenting no external signature. 
Chemical process equipment required 
to produce CW agents is not unique and 
is found in many commercial chemical 
production facilities. A CW production 
facility could be hidden within many 
of the world’s 10,000 commercial 
chemical plants and not be apparent 


from a plant tour. How can CW ac- 
tivities, i.e., “suspect sites,” be iden- 
tified within such a broad universe of 
potential sites? 

Consensus is that the technical 
secretariat will have limited assets to 
conduct challenge inspections at 
suspect sites. Furthermore, it seems 
unlikely that it will have the ability to 
identify suspect sites. Therefore, na- 
tional intelligence assets will need to be 
used to detect possible cheating and 
focus challenges on suspect sites. Upon 
request, the technical secretariat would 
then use challenge inspections to in- 
vestigate whether cheating has oc- 
curred. 

This last step is not straight forward. 
There is evidence that a CW agent pro- 
duction facility could be cleaned up 
and switched to a legitimate commer- 
cial product within 12 hours. Traces of 
CW agents, intermediates, or degrada- 
tion products may not be detectable 




TABLE 1 



VERIFICATION SCENARIOS 

I. 

El imination 

of Existing CW Stocks and Production Facilities. 


Scenario 1. 

CW Stockpile Declaration 


Scenario 2. 

Movement of CW Stocks to Destruction Facility 


Scenario 3. 

Destruction of CW Stocks 


Scenario 4. 

CW Production Facility Declaration and Closure 


Scenario 5. 

Destruction (Conversion) of CW Production Facility 

II. 

CW Related Activities Not Prohibited by Treaty 


Scenario 6. 

Production of (<1000 kg) Schedule 1 (CW Substances) 


Scenario 7. 

Production of Schedule 2 Materials 
(CW Precursor Substances) 


Scenario 8. 

Production of Schedule 3 Materials 
(Dual Use Chemicals) 

III. 

Fact Finding 

Missions 


Scenario 9. 

Challenge of Facilities and/or Stocks 


Scenario 10. 

Challenge or Investigation of Use 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 23 


after several days. Conversely, a 
1,000-ton CW stockpile could be 
moved within 2-3 days. Thus, the abili- 
ty to confirm cheating is dependent on 
the speed with which challenge inspec- 
tions can be conducted. 

A goal of the CWC verification R&D 
program underway within DOD is to 
evaluate verification procedures and 
equipment that could realistically be 
employed by the technical secretariat 
given the realities of the CW verifica- 
tion problem discussed above. Some of 
the effort applies to the problem of 
identifying suspect sites, but that objec- 
tive is being addressed within the in- 
telligence community and is not 
further discussed here. 

Treaty Verification 
R&D Program 

The overall structure of the CRDEC 
effort is depicted in Figure 1. The foun- 
dation of the program is the provisions 
of the CWC draft text which serve as re- 
quirements for CW verification. Results 
from the program are provided through 

Figure 1 

Program 

Structure 


DNA and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense to the U.S. negotiators. This 
dynamic feed-back loop provides 
technical assessments to the CWC 
negotiators and verification re- 
quirements to the R&D program. 

Because of the difficulty and scope 
of the CW verification problem, 
CRDEC requested assistance from a 
wide array of U.S. research organiza- 
tions. Five Department of Energy Na- 
tional Laboratories are participating in 
field testing and other specialized areas. 
The U.S. Army Medical Research In- 
stitute of Infectious Disease is working 
on toxin analysts and Dugway Proving 
Ground is assisting in field testing. In 
addition, EAI Corporation is assisting 
CRDEC with data integration, field 
testing and equipment surveys. 

Existing sampling equipment, meth- 
ods, and draft protocols are being 
evaluated for on-site and off-site sam- 
ple analysis, and a shipping container 
for chemical samples is being fabricated 
for possible use by CWC international 
inspectors. Evaluation of configura- 
tions and detailed requirements for in- 



L J 


ternational and national laboratories to 
support the CWC are also underway. 
These tasks, taken together, will evolve 
into recommendations on a sampling 
and analytical system needed to imple- 
ment the CWC. 

An international market survey is be- 
ing conducted to identify off-the-shelf 
equipment appropriate for inspections 
under the CWC. The equipment 
selected for evaluation includes 
chemical sensors, physical measuring 
devices, physical protective equipment, 
tags and seals, monitoring devices, and 
medical support kits. For practical use, 
these are being integrated into air- 
transportable systems. 

The third task, field demonstration 
of available technology, provides the 
opportunity to field test verification 
procedures, equipment and systems 
under Tasks 1 and 2. Verification con- 
cepts are developed for each verifica- 
tion scenario, and are based on the 
CWC draft text. A project team then 
takes the concepts to a model U.S. site, 
a CW stockpile for example, and con- 
ducts a baseline survey to refine the 
verification concepts. The survey 
results are used to prepare a first order 
estimate of verification effectiveness, 
cost and intrusiveness for a range of 
verification concepts. 

The equipment selected from market 
surveys is then tested in an equipment 
field trial at a model U.S. site to deter- 
mine its suitability. The recommended 
equipment from this field test is in- 
tegrated into air-transportable verifica- 
tion modules and tested as a total 
system in a system field demonstration. 
National trial inspections (NTIs) are 
conducted by the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to exer- 
cise U.S. policy in areas such as the 
diplomatic procedures for entering 
country, provision of escorts, and 
translators, etc., in addition to inspec- 
tion procedures and equipment. The 
CRDEC has played a key role in the four 
U.S. NTIs conducted to date. This 
iterative testing process will provide 
fully demonstrated verification systems 
and procedures for each verification 
scenario. 

Preliminary Findings 

Preliminary verification concepts 
were identified for each of the 10 
scenarios. The concepts provide a 
range in effectiveness, intrusiveness 


24 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


SITUATION 

INITIAL DECLARATION 

LONG TERM SECURITY 

Verification 

Aim 

Confirm accuracy of 
declaration 

Ensure no undetected 
removal 

Operational 

Concept 

100% stack count 
Sample boxes/containers 
Sample agent (100 items) 
On-site analysis 
Non-destructive Test 
Physical measurement 

Re-inventory 50%/6 mo. 
Spot sample agent 

Cost* 

1.2 Million 

1. 4-2.0 Million 


* Five Year Cost 


Figure 2. 

Recommended Verification System for CV\J Stockpile. 


and cost in order to provide flexibility 
to U.S. negotiators as they develop trea- 
ty provisions. 

Preliminary verification concepts 
were taken to Tooele Army Depot, a 
major U.S. CW stockpile site, and refin- 
ed with the input of site personnel and 
observations. The refined operational 
concepts were evaluated for effec- 
tiveness, intrusiveness and cost. These 
three factors were balanced and a 
recommended verification system was 
proposed (Figure 2). The recommend- 
ed approach is the lowest cost option 
that achieves a reasonable effectiveness 
in meeting verification aims and a 
moderate level of intrusiveness to site 
operations and security. 

Findings from the Tooele baseline 
survey were used to evaluate the pro- 
visions of the CWC draft text. At the 
detail level, a number of the current 
CWC provisions were found to require 
possible modification. These findings 
were provided to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense in a timely man- 
ner for use in CWC and bilateral 
negotiations. To date, baseline surveys 
are completed on Scenarios 1 through 


8. Equipment field trials are underway. 

Conclusion 

Verifying the CWC is a daunting 
challenge. The unbounded number of 
potential cheating sites and lack of 
unique signatures precludes absolute 
verification of compliance. A rational 
fail-back position is to use verification 
as a deterrence to cheating by creating 
some risk that a cheating state party 
would be caught. To achieve this objec- 
tive the verification measures must be 
credible and practical — they must have 
a reasonable effectiveness at an ob- 
tainable cost and acceptable level of in- 
trusiveness. 

Based on program progress to date, 
the extent to which the CWC can be 
verified could be estimated within a 
year. This information will provide a 
technical basis for the very difficult 
policy decisions that lie ahead in 
reaching a final Chemical Weapons 
Convention. 


DR. RICHARD HUTCHINSON is 
chief of the CW Treaty Office, Muni- 
tions Directorate, U.S. Army 
Chemical RD&E Center. He holds a 
B.S. degree in chemical engineering 
from Penn. State University and a 
Ph.D. in chemical engineering from 
Lehigh University and is a graduate 
of the U.S. Army War College. 

ROBERT E. LENTZ is deputy of 
the CW Treaty Office, Munitions 
Directorate, U.S. Army Chemical 
RD&E Center He holds a B.S. degree 
in chemical engineering from Johns 
Hopkins University. 

STEPHEN L. ENGLISH is a team 
leader in treaty verification 
technology with the U.S. Army 
Chemical RD&E Center He holds a 
B.S. degree in science from Gannon 
University, an M.A. degree in 
management and supervision from 
Central Michigan University, and is 
a graduate of the U.S. Army Com- 
mand and General Staff College. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 25 


COMMANDING GENERAL 
U.S. ARMY TACOM 

MG LeoJ. Pigaty was 
commissioned a second 
lieutenant through the 
ROTC program upon 
graduation from 

Lafayette College in 
Pennsylvania, where he 
earned a bachelor's 
degree in civil engineer- 
ing. MG Pigaty also 
received a master of 
science degree in 
logistics management 
from the Air Force In- 
stitute of Technology. 

His military education 
includes the Basic and Advanced Officer Courses at the Ord- 
nance School, U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- 
lege, U.S. Army War College, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Capstone Course. Other important command and staff posi- 
tions he has held include: logistics officer, Office of the Depu- 
ty Chief of Staff for Logistics, Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, Washington, D.C.; commander. 1st Maintenance 
Battalion; chief, 800th Materiel Management Center, and assis- 
tant chief of staff for materiel, 2d Corps Support Command, 
VII Corps, U.S. Army Europe; commander, Anniston Army 
Depot, Anniston, AL; deputy commanding general for 
research and development at the Troop Support Command, 
St. Louis, MO; and commander, Defense Industrial Supply 
Support Command, St. Louis, MO; and commander, Defense 
Industrial Supply Center, Defense Logistics Agency, 
Philadelphia, PA. 

Mission and Organization 

The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) is a 
major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Materiel Com- 
mand. TACOM’s mission is integrated commodity manage- 
ment of tanks, automotive ground vehicles, construction 
equipment, materials handling equipment, and other assigned 
materiel. Other mission areas include research and develop- 
ment, design, acquisition, engineering, safety, materiel 
readiness, integrated logistics support, sustainment, and 
seeurity assistance services. 

The command conducts basic and applied research and 
related technologies for assigned vehicle systems and other 
associated developmental programs. TACOM manages the 
RDE Center for all tank science and technology and executes 
assigned missions in support of other AMC or DOD elements 
worldwide. 



TACOM COMMAND GROUP 

Warren, MI 48397-5000 


Commanding General 

Deputy Commander 
for Research, 
Development and 
Engineering 
Deputy Commanding 
General for 
Procurement and 
Readiness 


MG LeoJ. Pigaty 
Dr. Kenneth J. Oscar 

BG James W. Monroe 


DSN: 786-5131 
Comm: (313) 574-5131 
DSN: 786-6144 
Comm: (313) 574-6144 


DSN: 786-5134 
Comm: (31.3) 574-5134 



MI-SERIES ABRAMS 

The Miseries Abrams tank is an impressive performer and is 
tanks of the past. Its 1,500 horsepower gas turbine engine 
20 mph in seven seconds. Gun stabilization advanced fire control 
main-gun accuracy that has been successfully demonstrated repeal 
tions and exercises. 


U.S. ARM 
TANK-AUTOM 
COMMAND (TK 


U.S. ARI\if 
TANK-AUTOM 
RESEARCH, DEVIi! 
AND ENGINED 
CENTER (TAB 




November-December 1991 


26 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 



I f 

DTIVE 

COM) 

ir 

E)TIVE 

LOPMENT 

RING 

DEC) 


i 

1 5/e and less costly to maintain than 
■ ! 0- to 67-ton tanks from standing to 
J i ermal imaging combine for deadly 
: in numerous international competi- 


TACOM DEPUTY COMMANDER 
FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT 
AND ENGINEERING 
AND DIRECTOR, TARDEC 

Dr. Kenneth J. Oscar holds a B.S. degree in 
physics from Clarkson University and M S. and 
Ph.D. degrees in physics from American Univer- 
sity. His previous positions include: director, 
Combat Engineer Support Laboratory, Belvoir 
RDE Center; associate technical director for 
research and development, U.S. Army Troop 
Support Command; and assistant deputy chief 
of staff for development, engineering and ac- 
quisition, HQ, Army Materiel Command. At the 
beginning of Operation Desert Shield in 1990, 
Dr. Oscar was temporarily assigned as TACOM acting deputy commander for pro- 
curement and readiness, where he served until the conclusion of the Persian Gulf 
War. 

Mission and Organization 

TARDEC is the Department of Defense (DOD) lead agency for research, develop- 
ment and engineering of the U.S. Armed Forces’ ground mobility fleet and is one 
of three CRAY supercomputer sites in the Army. More than 550 of the center’s 925 
employees are engineers and scientists. 

In addition to maintaining close interface with TACOM s commanding general, 
deputy commander for procurement and readiness, and Army program executive 
officers, TARDEC engineers and scientists also work closely with their counterparts 
throughout the U.S. Army Materiel Command, other Army agencies, and DOD. 

Committed to excellence, TARDEC has implemented a Total Quality Management 
(TQM) program with a bias for action. By encouraging employee participation in 
every aspect of its operations, TARDEC’s TQM program has unleashed the creative 
forces of the center’s personnel in improving processes ranging from technical data 
package generation to the acquisition and management of lab equipment. 

Customer identification and satisfaction are a vital part of TARDEC’s TQM 
philosophy. The TARDEC Business Plan is an innovative marketing strategy that 
revolves around customer needs. AMC has recognized TARDEC as being one of the 
first RDE Centers to develop a comprehensive Business Plan. 

The Business Plan contains the strategy by which TARDEC manages resources, 
increases quality, and pursues new customers. TARDEC actively interacts with its 
customers through customer site visits and an annual customer conference. This 
bold program identifies TARDEC as a leader among Army RDE Centers. 

TARDEC has a strong commitment to promoting equal opportunity in the 
workplace, as well as in the local community. The center is presently establishing 
a pre-engineering and science program for Detroit area high school students. The 
students will be brought to TARDEC to work on a variety of engineering projects 
to stimulate their interest in the field of science and engineering. The center has 
also formed a recruiting team that visits minority colleges and universities 
throughout the country to interview students interested in pursuing federal employ- 
ment. Additionally, an annual Engineering Open House affords entry- and 
journeyman-level minority and female engineers and scientists the chance to join 
the TARDEC work force. 

TARDEC conducts research and development of new technologies in the following 
areas: vehicle electronics, survivability, ground propulsion, simulation, track and 
suspension, robotics and technical integration. These technologies, with those 
developed in other DOD laboratories and RDE centers, industry and friendly foreign 
countries, are integrated at the appropriate time into new, combat-ready fielded 
systems. 

TARDEC not only assists in the development of systems but also supports all 
ground-vehicle systems throughout the full-scale development, production and 
fielding phases. Continued on page 28 



November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 27 



Looking Ahead 

An important objective at TARDEC is to develop new, more 
combat-effective systems capable of surviving the rigors of tomor- 
row’s battlefield. To help meet this goal, TARDEC is focusing at- 
tention on several key technological areas: 

• VETRONICS (VEhicle ElecTRONICS). A long-term 
VETRONICS program is under way to develop a computer- 
controlled electrical and electronic system with common hardware 
and software modules that will support both combat and tactical 
vehicles planned for introduction during the mid- 1990s and 
beyond. The design of this system is known as the Standard Army 
VETRONICS Architecture (SAVA). 

Current sophisticated vehicle designs use separate electrical and 
electronic components to handle specific tasks, which results in 
significant duplication of electronic functions and an overwhelm- 
ing number of controls and displays for the crew. The SAVA will 
partition a vehicle according to functions rather than subsystems, 
thereby making it possible to provide for common functions such 
as data processing, memory, and multifunctional controls and 
displays that can be shared by several vehicle subsystems. This 
reduces the size and weight of the vehicle electronics and makes 
it easier for the crew to operate. A first-generation vehicle SAVA 
was tested in FY92 in the new M1A2 tank, and the results are a leap 
ahead in battlefield performance. 

•Survivability. TARDEC s priority technical objectives include 
revolutionary, non-traditional approaches toward surviving on 
highly lethal future battlefields. Emphasis is on improving signature- 
reduction materials and techniques, fire suppression, advanced ar- 
mor technologies and integration, and crew and system reaction 
techniques. 

In two major thrust areas, TARDEC is actively developing 
countermeasures to protect U.S. combat vehicles against acquisi- 
tion and targeting. First, it is developing engineering models that 
aid in the design of vehicles with minimum infrared, acoustic, 
millimeter wavelength and radar signatures. TARDEC is also striv- 
ing to develop models in the visible area of the spectrum. These 
models are being provided to all vehicle system contractors and 
are being used to aid in the design of the Armor System Moder- 
nization vehicle family. 

The second signature thrust area is in the modification of ex- 
isting combat vehicles through the application of signature sup- 
pression materials and designs. This effort aids in the evaluation 
of the impact of various levels of signature reduction against smart 
munitions and target acquisition, and in the definition of re- 
quirements for new vehicle systems. 

In “hit avoidance” countermeasures (where threat weapons can 
be interrupted at some point in their delivery), TARDEC s efforts 
are directed toward modular integration of electronic warfare threat 
warning receivers and countermeasure reactions. This is ac- 
complished through incorporation of the U.S. Army 
Communications-Electronics Command’s Vehicle Integration 
Defense System (VIDS). VIDS utilizes the SAVA VETRONICS ar- 
chitecture, including the central processor, the communication 
busses and the crew controls and displays to identify and prioritize 
threats and select and initiate the optimum countermeasure 
reactions. 

TARDEC is working with the U.S. Army Ballistic Research 
Laboratory to develop various armors in support of the Army’s Ar- 
mored Systems Modernization Program. This program requires the 
development of armors for all applications to the armored family 
of vehicles, in both the medium and heavy threat categories. 
TARDEC’s damage reduction efforts include work in spall protec- 
tion, fuel and ammunition fire suppression, and in directed energy 
hardening. Fire-suppression and laser-hardening technology and 
systems have been developed and fielded in the current combat 
vehicle fleet. 

• Mobility. TARDEC has a world-class ground-vehicle propul- 
sion, track and suspension and vehicle design capability. Its super- 


computer is netted throughout the command to rapidly integrate 
the U.S. Army Missile Command’s missiles and the U.S. Army Ar- 
mament, Munitions and Chemical Command’s guns into 
sophisticated, new vehicle designs. 

• Composites. In a long-term research program under way to 
fill a growing need for lightweight, air-transportable combat 
vehicles suitable for rapid deployment anywhere in the world, 
TARDEC plans to develop a Composite Armored Vehicle Advanc- 
ed Technology Transition Demonstrator (CAV ATTD). This vehi- 
cle will help engineers evaluate advanced lightweight composite 
materials, survivability, and two-man- crew technologies required 
to meet future sophisticated battlefield threats. 


TARDEC COMMAND GROUP 


Director, 

TACOM RDE Center 
Acting Deputy Director 
for Engineering 
and Acquisition 
Deputy Director 
for Research 
and Development 
Deputy Director 
for Technical 
Operations 


Warren, MI 48397-5000 

Dr. Kenneth J. Oscar 

Richard E. Minnis 


DSN: 786-6144 
Comm: (313) 574-6144 
DSN: 786-6113 
Comm: (313) 574-6113 


Wayne K. Wheelock DSN: 786-5494 

Comm: (313) 574-5494 


Richard E. Minnis 


DSN: 786-6539 
Comm: (313) 574-6113 



M2/M3 BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE 
(BFV) 

More than just an armored personnel carrier, the Bradley represents the first 
armored vehicle to allow the American infantry squad to fight while moving 
at high speed. The BFV fleet first added the dimension of infantry fighting- 
from-under-armor when it replaced M113 series APCs at the 2nd Armored 
Division in 1983. The Bradley fleet consists of M2-series Infantry Fighting 
Vehicles designed for a nine-man infantry squad and M3-series Cavalry 


Fighting Vehicles designed for a five-man cavalry squad serving in armored 
cavalry units and as scouts for mechanized infantry and tank battalions. 



28 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 



M998-SERIES HIGH-MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE 
WHEELED VEHICLE (HMMWV) 

In the early 1980s, facing changes in battlefield technology, the 
Army focused on the need for a high-mobility, light truck capable of 
performing a variety of missions. The Army needed an air- 
transportable, reliable, maintainable and survivable vehicle to fill 
cargo-carrier, troop-carrier and armament requirements, as well as 
certain ambulance and shelter-roles in the 1 /4-ton to 1-1/4 ton 
range. The HMMWV meets all of these requirements. 



M9 ARMORED COMBAT EARTH MOVER 
(M9 ACE) 

The Army’s M9 ACE digs as fast as the most ef- 
ficient bulldozer, travels 30 mph cross-country, is 
air-transportable and offers armor protection 
equal to that of the M113-series armored person- 
nel carrier (APC). The M9 enhances the ability of 
engineer platoons and divisional engineer bat- 
talions to perform vital support missions. These 
include constructing antitank ditches, digging in 
infantry, artillery and armor, and tasks once 
handled by many different pieces of slow-moving 
civilian construction equipment that lacked the 
armor protection needed to survive in combat. 



M 977-SERIES HEAVY EXPANDED MOBILITY 
TACTICAL TRUCK (HEMTT) 

This truck, which performs cross-country military missions, car- 
ries payloads up to 11 tons and performs well both on and off 
the road. The design objectives gave prime consideration to 
industry-proven heavy-duty truck components, ease of 
maintenance, and interchangeability of major parts within the 
vehicle series. The truck is used for direct re-arming of the 
multiple Launch Rocket System, transport of Patriot erec- 
tor/launchers, resupply of field artillery ammunition and forward 
area re-arm vehicles in armor, cavalry and infantry units, refuel- 
ing of tracked and wheeled vehicles and helicopters in the for- 
ward areas, and recovery of disabled wheeled vehicles. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 29 




THE ARMY 
INDUSTRIAL 
MODERNIZATION 
INCENTIVES 
PROGRAM 


By Eddie Japzon 


The IMIP focuses 
on factory- 
wide or single product 
or process line improvements 

by analyzing 
the total 
business environment 
and by considering 
well established 
and state-of-the-art 
technologies. 


Introduction 

Since the fielding of quality weapons 
systems to American soldiers is depend- 
ent on industry’s ability to produce 
them, a strong industrial base is a key 
element in the U.S. acquisition process. 
One effort to achieve a strong industry 
base is the DOD’s Industrial Modern- 
ization Incentives Program (IMIP) 
which assists military contractors in 
manufacturing quality products. 

IMIP offers incentives to contractors 
so that they can modernize their 
facilities and improve the defense in- 
dustrial base. It entails a structured 
engineering analysis and creates a more 
cost-efficient defense production 
capability for weapon systems, equip- 
ment and material. Under the IMIP — 
which is implemented through a 
“business agreement,” the government 
offers contractors certain incentives for 
financing capital investments to expand 
their industrial productivity when 
market forces are normally insufficient 
to motivate such expansion. 

The IMIP focuses on factory-wide or 
single product or process line im- 
provements by analyzing the total 
business environment and by consider- 
ing well established and state-of-the-art 
technologies. 

The IMIP evolved from the Air 
Force Technology Modernization 
(TECHMOD) Program and the Army In- 
dustrial Productivity Improvement 
(IPI) Program. In 1982, DOD integrated 
these separate programs into the IMIP 
to enhance and revitalize the defense 
industrial base. In 1985, policies regard- 
ing the IMIP were implemented under 
the DOD Directives 5000.44 and the 
accompanying DOD Guide 5000. 44G. 

Objectives 

Short-term objectives are to increase 
productivity; shorten lead times; im- 
prove product quality, maintainability 
and reliability; and reduce costs. The 
long-term objectives are to maintain a 
strong defense industrial base which 
meets current defense needs and to re- 
spond to surge and mobilization re- 
quirements. 

Accomplishments 

During the 1980s, the Army’s IMIP 
efforts were primarily centered at the 
Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP) and 
the General Dynamics Land Systems 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


(GDLS) Division facilities. These 
facilities produced and assembled the 
Ml tank engines and the tank main 
frames respectively. These facilities 
permitted the Army to motivate con- 
tractors to invest approximately $1.70 
for every $1.00 of Army investment. 
This Army-contractor effort resulted in 
FY87 through FY91 savings of approx- 
imately $153 million which were pass- 
ed on to the Army in a reduced cost of 
the Ml tank. These savings translated to 
a return on investment of $4.25 for 
every $1.00 of Army investment. 

Some of the modernization projects 
undertaken at SAEP were: 

• Group Technology Concept 
Manufacturing guided the rearrange- 
ment of the factory into manufacturing 
cells that machined groups of similar 
parts. It also guided the layout of the 
factory into a logical process flow, with 
incorporation of an advanced material 
handling system. 

• Master Planning and Control 
System computerized all decisions and 
activities regarding material flow and 
allocation of resources while in- 
tegrating these activities with design 
and process development. Examples of 
subsystems were: master schedule, con- 
tract material planning, design 
engineering, inventory control, 
manufacturing engineering, shop floor 
control and capacity requirements 
planning, tool inventory management 
system. 

• Manufacturing Equipment 
Modernization initiated the rebuild- 
ing of some equipment if the cost to 
rebuild was less than 65 percent of the 
cost of the new machine and acquired 
new equipments, i.e., gear grinding us- 
ing cubic boron nitride, cutting and 
drilling sheet metal using a laser beam, 
deburring of machined metal parts us- 
ing a robotic system, and stamping the 
Inconel 624 recuperator disks using a 
four press system with automatic part 
transfer. 

• Material Handling Moderniza- 
tion integrated, by computer, receiv- 
ing, receiving inspection, and 
inspection buffer storage to enhance 
the receipt of dock-to-stock material 
handling; through the use of automated 
guided vehicles that transport the 
material to pick up and drop off points 
inside the factory; and through a com- 
puterized high rise/high density storage 
area for finished parts. 

These modernization efforts at SAEP 


Long-term objectives 
are to maintain a strong 
defense industrial base 
which meets current 
defense needs and to 
respond to surge 
and mobilization 
requirements. 


resulted in a 50 percent reduction in the 
number of production machines; an 85 
percent reduction in rework and scrap; 
tripled output; a 20-day cut (from 25 
to five) from dock-to-stock, and a 50 
percent increase in factory efficiency. 

The Army, in 1984, also supported a 
factory engineering analysis at four 
GDLS facilities — Lima, Detroit, Scran- 
ton and Sterling — which enabled the 
contractor to benchmark operations 
and to identify and prioritize a broad 
range of “target of opportunities” for 
productivity improvements. This 
analysis resulted in the installation of 
a Manufacturing Resource Planning 
(MRP) System division-wide, a com- 
puterized and vision-directed arc 
welding robotic system for the fabrica- 
tion of the tank main frame, and a 
number of high risk technology 
development projects that were fund- 
ed by manufacturing technology 
(MANTECH). The installation of these 
advanced systems and technology pro- 
jects resulted in savings that have been 
passed on to the Army. 

Three Phases Of IMIP 

The efforts to improve productivity 
at these facilities entailed the use of the 
three phases of IMIP. Phase I deter- 
mined the “as is” and “to be” condi- 
tions of the facility which formulated 
the strategic plan and the conceptual 
designs of the modernization re- 
quirements. Phase II detailed the 
design, development and validation of 
the modernization opportunities iden- 
tified in Phase I. In this phase, im- 
plementation plans were identified, 
hardware and software requirements 
were determined, specific applications 
were validated through modeling or 
method demonstrations and cost 


benefit analysis performed. Phase III 
involved the contractor purchase and 
installation of the equipment needed to 
implement and complete the modern- 
ization project. Only upon completion 
did the Army begin to realize the sav- 
ings and the contractor rewarded as 
negotiated. The Army fully funded all 
Phase I projects and some of the Phase 
II projects. 

Manufacturing Technology 
Program 

In implementing these projects, the 
MANTECH Program complemented 
and supported the IMIP efforts, e g., 
robotic deburring at SAEP and im- 
plementation of high risk technologies 
at GDLS. Both MANTECH and IMIP, 
components of the Industrial Prepared- 
ness Program, aim to ensure readiness 
and responsiveness of the defense in- 
dustrial base to the needs of the military 
establishment. 

MANTECH, however, was employed 
in making first-case manufacturing pro- 
cesses and equipment improvements. 
IMIP, on the other hand, focused on 
further implementing successfully 
demonstrated MANTECH projects on 
the shop floor. 

Key Incentives 

The application of Army funded 
Phase I and II projects and the Produc- 
tivity Savings Rewards (PSR) which 
were paid to the contractors after sav- 
ings verification, were the incentives 
that made the contractors undertake 
the modernization of their facilities. 
The PSR, encompassing the savings 
sharing ratio, was negotiated between 
the Army and the contractors before 
they embarked on the productivity 
enhancing capital investments and 
related productivity improvement ef- 
forts. Incentives provided to the con- 
tractors were commensurate with the 
degree of contractor funding, risk of 
the investment, and other economic 
factors. 

Business Agreement 

The key document that was crafted 
by the Army and the contractors in the 
early phases of IMIP to guarantee its 
success was the “Business Agreement.” 
Instead of the Army being simply a 
customer and the contractors simply a 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 31 



source of supply, both parties entered 
into a partnership in which each shared 
the risks and the rewards of advancing 
production technology and moderniz- 
ing industrial plants. 

Current and Future 
Contractor Participation 

Army IMIP funding has been limited 
over the past few years. Currently, the 
Army is assisting in the implementation 
of modernization projects that support 
systems being procured at the follow- 
ing contractor facilities: 

• Saco Defense Incorporated, Saco, 
ME; 

• Alliant Techsystems Incorporated, 
New Brighton, MN; 

• Allison Gas Turbine Division of 
General Motors, Indianapolis, IN; 

• Allison Transmission Division of 
General Motors, Indianapolis, IN; 

• Garrett Engine Division of Allied- 
Signal Company, Phoenix, AZ; 

• Litton Precision Gear Company, 
Chicago, IL; 

• Bell Helicopter Textron Incor- 
porated, Fort Worth, TX; and 

• McDonnell Douglas Helicopter 
Company, Mesa, AZ. 

Future plans call for the initiation of 
IMIP at the Boeing Helicopter facility 
at Ridley Park, PA; Sikorsky Aircraft 


IMIP/MANTECH Relationship. 

facility at Stratford, CT, and various 
subcontractor facilities that support the 
development of the Comanche (Light 
Helicopter) Air Vehicle. 

How To Participate 

A contractor normally initiates par- 
ticipation in IMIP prior to the Full Scale 
Engineering Development (FSED) 
phase of a materiel acquisition. Army 
contractors, interested in formulating 
Business Agreements, should submit 
modernization proposals by way of the 
program executive office (PEO) to the 
Army major subordinate command 
(MSC) with whom they are under con- 
tract. The MSC, in turn, passes on con- 
tractor proposals to the Office of the 
Deputy Chief Of Staff for Concurrent 
Engineering at Headquarters, U.S. 
Army Materiel Command, for funding 
approval. 

Project Evaluation Criteria 

Criteria that are used in determining 
whether to fund a project proposal are 
the outyear materiel requirements, two 
years or less payback on the Army in- 
vestment, a short duration of the proj- 
ect, PEO /PM support, and the 
estimated contractor or other govern- 
ment agency investment. 


Conclusions 

This is just a brief overview of the 
Army IMIP and its role in the enhance- 
ment of the defense industrial base. It 
is a low key effort, not robustly fund- 
ed, but an essential Army program. 
Essential, if we expect Army contrac- 
tors to continue to manufacture and 
assemble quality and reliable products 
that gain the full trust and confidence 
of the ultimate user — the soldier. The 
superb performance of the Ml tanks in 
Operation Desert Storm further 
demonstrated the value and benefits of 
IMIP as a force behind the moderniza- 
tion of the facilities that produced these 
tanks. 


EDDIE JAPZON is the staff 
engineer for IMIP in the Office of 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Con- 
current Engineering, Headquarters 
U.S. Army Materiel Command. He 
has a B.S. degree in mechanical 
engineering from the University of 
San Carlos in the Philippines and 
an M.S. degree in management 
from Frostburg State University in 
Maryland. 


32 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


INNOVATIVE 

OPERATIONAL 

TESTING 

A Preview 
of the Future 


By MAJ Laurence A. Womack 


Introduction 

With the shrinking defense budget 
and the push to get new and reliable 
systems into the field quickly, the test 
and evaluation community must re- 
think how to conduct quality testing to 
ensure quality products. This testing 
must be thorough, must stress the 
system under field conditions, and 
must be timely, cost effective, and 
designed to use minimum resources. 

By definition, an operational test is 
the field test of the system under 
realistic combat conditions by repre- 
sentative military users. It uses person- 
nel with the same military occupational 
specialty as those who will operate, 
maintain, and support the system when 
deployed. 

Operational testing is expensive, 
which is why the need for innovation 
in operational testing is necessary. An 
example of an innovative approach was 
testing of the Lightweight Tactical Fire 
Direction System (LTACFIRE) and the 
Forward Entry Device (FED) conducted 
by the Test and Experimentation Com- 
mand’s Fire Support Test Directorate 
during 1990 at Fort Ord, CA. 

Background and Purpose 

In FY 88, Congress directed the 


Army to procure LTACFIRE for light in- 
fantry divisions. In the plan for pro- 
curement, a force development test and 
experimentation (FDTE) would be con- 
ducted after the first light infantry divi- 
sion was fielded with LTACFIRE. The 
7th Infantry Division (Light) was field- 
ed with LTACFIRE and LTACFIRE FDTE 
in late 1990. 

The purpose of the LTACFIRE FDTE 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
automation and to refine future 
organization, maintenance, and train- 
ing in the light infantry division. 

In March and April 1990, the FED 
underwent an initial operational test 
and evaluation and did not meet its re- 
quired operational capabilities in 
several areas. Because of the potential 
impact on the Army Tactical Command 
and Control System Common Hard- 
ware Software Program, a follow-on 
operational test and evaluation (FOTE) 
became necessary. The purpose of the 
FED FOTE, which was conducted in 
late 1990, was to evaluate the in- 
teroperability, system reliability, opera- 
tional effectiveness, and training of the 
FED in the light infantry division fire 
support system and to verify that cor- 
rections identified in the initial opera 


tional test and evaluation were im- 
plemented. 


System Description 

The LTACFIRE is an interim system to 
replace the manual methods used by 
the light infantry division artillery. It is 
a lightweight, transportable, decen- 
tralized computer processing system 
for the control of artillery and mortar 
fires at division, brigade, and battalion 
level. It has user-friendly, menu-driven 
software, with a “touch screen’’ 
method of entry, which provides the 
light forces with responsive and con- 
tinuous fire support (See Figure 1). 

The FED hardware, with common 
software, is a nondevelopmental item 
which the Army will purchase under 
the Army Tactical Command and Con- 
trol System Common Hardware Soft- 
ware Program to replace the currently 
fielded digital message device. It is a 
lightweight, hand-held, input/output 
device for foot mobile forward observ- 
ers and fire support teams to use in con- 
ducting and planning fire support 
operations (See Figure 2). 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 33 



Test Concerns 

The initial concept was to conduct 
both the LTACFIRE FDTE and FED 
FOTE concurrently, but separately. This 
concept was pursued because the ex- 
perimentation aspect of the LTACFIRE 
FDTE allowed maximum flexibility in 
correcting test related problems with 
doctrine, scenario inputs, and equip- 
ment. On the other hand, the FED 
FOTE was a pure evaluation which re- 
quired strict control to determine if the 
FED met or failed to meet its required 
operational capabilities. This approach 
dictated two separate test directorates 
and the associated duplication of many 
functions, a large increase in funding 
for temporary duty and civilian local 
hire, and the need for additional in- 


strumentation support. 

An additional problem that was a 
potential “show stopper” was the 
beginning of “Operation Desert 
Shield,” which put all FORSCOM sup- 
port taskings on hold. The impending 
lack of support surfaced the need to 
develop an approach to testing that 
allowed for the reduction of personnel 
and cost to the minimum numbers re- 
quired to accomplish both missions. At 
this point, the consolidation of person- 
nel and resources was considered and 
the advantages and disadvantages 
evaluated. The Test and Evaluation 
Command’s Fire Support Test Direc- 
torate formulated a plan and presented 
it to the U.S. Army Field Artillery 
School; TRADOC system manager, Fire 


Figure 2. 



Support Command Control, and Com- 
munications; program manager (PM), 
Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems 
(FATDS); and Operational Test and 
Evaluation Command. All endorsed the 
plan and work began on the test in- 
tegration design. 


Test Integration 

A four-step approach was used to in- 
tegrate both tests into one overall test 
plan. The first step was to finalize the 
list of essential personnel and resources 
needed by the test directorate to ac- 
complish the combined test. Figure 3 
illustrates the combined test direc- 
torate. This plan combined tasks and 
reduced the size of the test directorate 
from 123 personnel to 71 — a 42 percent 
reduction. 

The second step was to take the plan 
and identify where the resources could 
be obtained. This was critical because 
the 7th Infantry Division Artillery was 
tasked to provide all test players, data 
collectors, and support personnel iden- 
tified in the outline test plans. This 
could have been a possible ‘ ‘show stop- 
per” if the division artillery had to pro- 
vide all of the personnel. Our efforts to 
locate alternate sources for data collec- 
tors and support personnel were suc- 
cessful. 

U.S. Army Communications- 
Electronics Command’s New Equip- 
ment Training Team provided all the 
data collectors (13) for the LTACFIRE 
equipped nodes; U.S. Army Field Ar- 
tillery School provided operations per- 
sonnel (2); and U.S. Army Test and 
Experimentation Command’s Test Ex- 
perimentation Center provided all the 
FED data collectors (10). 

The third step was to integrate the 
time-ordered events lists for both tests. 
This was accomplished by placing the 
FED FIST team on a separate radio net 
into the battalion fire support element 
and dedicating a battery fire direction 
center from the FDTE. 

The fourth and final step was to brief 
all the key participants (U.S. Army Field 
Artillery School; U.S. Army Operational 
Test and Evaluation Command; PM 
FATDS; TRADOC system manager, Fire 
Support Command, Control and Com- 
munications; and 7th Light Infantry 
Division Artillery) concerning how to 
conduct the test integration and where 
to obtain the personnel. 


34 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 




LTACFIRE F DTE/FED FOTE 
TEST DIRECTORATE 



2- CPTs 

1- GS12 

1- GS12 

1- GS12 

3- NCOS 

3- NCOS 

28- OFFs/NCOs 

1- GS11 

5- CWO/NCOs 


1- CLERK/ 

2- GS9s 

2- OFFICERS 



TYPIST 

4- WAE5s 

3- COMPUTER 



8- DRIVERS 


OPERATORS 


55- MILITARY 


1S-DOD CIVILIANS 
71 TOTAL 


Funding 

In evaluating the funding re- 
quirements for combining these tests, 
the costs of conducting the tests 
separately was important to consider. 
The cost of each test was listed in the 
respective outline test plans. The LTAC- 
FIRE FDTE cost was $339K, and the 
FED FOTE would have cost approx- 
imately $274K (based on the cost of the 
FED initial operational test and evalua- 
tion). The combined test resulted in the 
FED FOTE costing $156. 3K, or a 43 
percent savings. This is intangible sav- 
ings realized by comparing the actual 
cost to the projected cost of a separate 
FOTE. The actual FOTE cost savings 
were the result of combining and 
streamlining existing resources already 
computed into the LTACFIRE FDTE. All 
of the costs required in the combined 
test for site support, instrumentation, 
and transportation of equipment to the 


Figure 3. 

test site at Fort Ord, CA, were reflected 
in the LTACFIRE FDTE outline test 
plans. Additionally, the coordination 
for the data collectors and test players 
from Fort Ord considerably reduced 
the overall temporary duty costs. 
Through these and other cost saving 
measures, the LTACFIRE FDTE/FED 
FOTE was conducted at a 34 percent 
savings of allocated funds. 

Conclusions 

Constrained budgets require in- 
novative concepts to create tests that 
are “cheap, fast, and good.” Our efforts 
are a first step in demonstrating that 
combining operational testing is a 
viable method of reducing resources 
and costs. 

The ultimate goal of all operational 
testing is to ensure the soldiers who use 
the equipment have an item which has 


proven it meets or exceeds the required 
operational capabilities. It is a 
challenge to all testers, whether opera- 
tional or technical, to continue to 
develop and implement innovative 
testing techniques to accomplish this 
goal with minimum resources. 


MA J LA URENCE A . WOMACK is 
afield artillery officer serving as a 
test arid evaluation officer in the 
U.S. Army Test and Experimenta- 
tion Command's Fire Support Test 
Directorate at Fort Sill, OK. He has 
a B.S. degree from West Virginia 
State College and is a graduate of 
the Materiel Acquisition Manage- 
ment Course. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 35 


THERAPY IN 
HIV POSITIVE PATIENTS 

USING 

RECOMBINANT 
GP160 VACCINE 


By LTC Robert R. Redfield, MC 


Introduction 

On June 13, 1991, The New England 
Journal of Medicine carried an article 
reporting on the trial use of a new vac- 
cine. The report brought inquiries from 
television, newspapers, magazines — 
and just plain people. For the first time, 
the researchers reported, a vaccine had 
been used to modify the body’s im- 
mune response to a chronic infection. 
The researchers were at the Walter Reed 
Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). 


The vaccine was called gp 160. The 
chronic infection was HIV, the virus 
that causes AIDS. It is work that truly 
defies more than 100 years of medical 
theory and teaching. Soon after Louis 
Pasteur proposed the use of vaccines as 
intervention in viral infection, other 
researchers demonstrated that “it 
couldn’t be done.” It remained an 
obscure theoretical possibility until the 
development of genetic engineering 
and the proliferation of technology 


among many different laboratories 
allowed the breakthrough research 
presented in the NEJM paper. 

The Known World 

Usually, the introduction of any an- 
tigen into the body stimulates the pro- 
duction of antibodies sufficient to 
control an infection. Immune 
responses to HIV antigens during 
natural infection are both humoral 
(neutralization antibody, viral receptor 
blocking antibody, antibody depend- 
ent cytotoxicity), and cellular (natural 
killer cell activity, HIV antigen-specific 
T-cell proliferative responses, cytotox- 
ic T-cell responses). Yet, despite these 
host-directed immune responses, HIV 
infection results in a progressive, 
debilitating disease of the immune 
system. The virus persists despite pro- 
duction of anti-viral antibodies and 
some evidence of the production of 
cytotoxic T-cells (the cells responsible 
for killing the virus-producing fac- 
tories). 

Based on today’s still-limited knowl- 
edge, it appears that certain antibodies, 
the T-helper response to the virus, and 
the T-cytotoxic responses, are blunted. 
Perhaps the virus “hides” some impor- 
tant immunogenic sites which would 
otherwise stimulate an effective viral 
immune response, or perhaps the 
primary infection of the T helper cell 
hinders the efficacy of the immune 
response. 

The Walter Reed researchers hypoth- 
esized that the host-directed immune 


The Walter Reed Staging Classificaton System for HIV Infection 


HIV 


Stage 

Anti- 
body or 
Culture 
Status 

Chronic 

Lym- 

CD4- 

Cells 

(pL) 

Delayed Hypersensitivity 
Skin Test 

Thrush 

tunistic 

Infec- 

tions 

WRO 



>400 

NORMAL 



WR1 

+ 


>400 

NORMAL 



WR2 

+ 

+ 

>400 

NORMAL 



WR3 

+ 

± 

<400 

NORMAL 



WR4 

+ 

± 

<400 

PARTIAL ANERGY 



WR5 

+ 

± 

<400 

COMPLETE ANERGY 

+ 


WR6 

+ 

± 

<400 

PARTIAL OR 
COMPLETE ANERGY 

± 

+ 


Stage Definitions: WRO defines members of high-risk groups; WR1-6 requires 
proof of infection by HIV. Patient must have CD4 count lower than 400 per uL 
persisting for 3 months or more to be classified WR Stage 3, 4. 5, or 6. 

Chronic lymphadenopathy, CD4 cell count and defects in delayed skin test 
hypersensitivity must be persistent for 3 months or more for criteria to be fulfilled, 

Anergy is defined as delayed reaction to an antigen, in this case introduced as a 
skin test for allergic reaction. 


36 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


response to HIV gradually weakens, 
resulting in poor control of viral 
replication. Vaccine therapy explores 
the possibility of boosting and expand- 
ing the body’s native immune respons- 
es to the virus that would help in 
controlling the infection. The hypoth- 
esis builds on the concept that, if 
critical viral proteins could be 
presented to the immune cells in a 
novel manner, a more effective anti- 
viral immune response could be gener- 
ated. Just as vaccines lead to protection 
from disease in the unprotected host, 
vaccines during infection with a virus 
may be able to redirect the immune 
system in a more effective way. These 
concepts are all hypothetical and re- 
main to be proven. There is still a 
critical need to understand which viral 
proteins would generate an effective 
immune response and improve viral 
control. 

If the natural HIV specific immune 
response could be intentionally altered 
in a chronically affected host, under- 
standing of HIV immunoregulation 
could be refined. Then the therapeutic 
potential of post-infection active im- 
munization could be directed to pro- 
duce specific control reponses. It might 
then be practical to modify the natural 
history of HIV infection. Under the 
direction of the Division of Retro- 
virology at WRAIR, the Military Medi- 
cal Consortium for Applied Retroviral 
Research is conducting a long-term 
evaluation of vaccine therapy using a 
recombinant HIV envelope protein 
called gp 160 in volunteers who are 
HIV-positive. 

The Vaccine 

Gpl60 is a protein on the outer sur- 
face of the HIV virus. Obtained through 
use of genetic engineering techniques 
unavailable even 10 years ago, the vac- 
cine is provided to the Army under a 
Cooperative Research and Develop- 
ment Agreement (CRDA) with the 
manufacturer, MicroGeneSys, Inc., of 
Meriden, CT. Since the vaccine is made 
with only a part of the whole virus, 
there is no chance that this product will 
cause infection. The gp 160 vaccine has 
been administered to 30 volunteers 
who are in Walter Reed stage 1 or 2 (see 
attached chart) in a Phase I trial, and 
more than 200 non-infected people 
and has been found to be safe. 

The results of the phase I trial were 


Research Team Cited 

On July 31, 1991, Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone 
recognized the nine members of the research team that 
published the New England Journal of Medicine article. In 
a ceremony at the Pentagon, Stone presented Meritorious 
Service Medals to COL Edmund Tramont, COL Donald 
Burke, LTC Robert Redfield, COL John Brundage, LTC 
Charles Davis, MAJ Deborah Birx-Raybuck, MAJ Steven 
Johnson, and CPT Victoria Polonis. COL Charles Oster, 
unable attend the ceremony, received his MSM at a later date. 

In addition to The Surgeon General LTG Frank Ledford, 
distinguished guests at the ceremony included Sen. Ted 
Stevens and Rep. John Murtha, both of whom have been 
strong supporters of the Army’s HIV research program. 


recently published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine. The trial was 
designed to explore dose and injection 
schedule, toxicity, and immunogeni- 
city. Briefly, the results of the study in- 
clude the following: 19 of 30 volunteers 
responded to the vaccine; that is, they 
increased both their humoral and cellu- 
lar anti-HIV envelope immunity in re- 
sponse to vaccination with gp 160. 
Some volunteers were able to make 
new antibodies against the virus and 
new T-cell responses to gp 160 were 
observed. No one involved in the trial 
had an adverse systemic reaction, and 
local reaction at the site of injection was 
mild. The vaccine did not cause any 
diminution of immune system capabili- 
ties as observed both in volunteers, and 
in laboratory analyses of blood and 
other samples. After 10 months of 
follow-up there was no decline in the 
mean CD4 cell count for the 19 vaccine 
responders, while CD4 counts among 
the non- responders declined approx- 
imately seven percent. 

The phase I trial showed that gp 160 
is a safe and immunogenic vaccine in 
the patients with chronic infection. 
Presently, a tri-service Phase II study to 
determine clinical efficacy is ongoing. 
Additionally, 27 of the 30 original 
Phase I volunteers are involved in a roll- 
over study to examine long term effects 
of vaccination and duration of immune 
response. Other studies involving gp 
160 are in the planning stages. It is 
hoped that these trials with gp 160 will 
increase our understanding of the host- 
initiated immune response in order to 
accentuate the body’s ability to fight 
the deadly HIV virus, and will serve to 
guide the DOD program to develop a 


vaccine for prevention. 

Having shown that the theory of in- 
tervention in chronic infection can 
work, researchers will hopefully find 
even wider application in the treatment 
of other viral diseases. 


LTC ROBERT REDFIELD, MC, is 
chief, Retroviral Research, Division 
of Retrovi rology Walter Reed A rmy 
Institute of Research. He received 
his B.S. degree from Georgetown 
University in 1973 and his MD from 
the same institution in 1977. He is 
on the faculty of the Uniformed 
Services University of Health 
Sciences and has authored or co- 
authored more than 60 papers in 
leading scientific journals world- 
wide. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 37 



APPLICATION 

OF 

LEVEL 

OF 

REPAIR 

ANALYSIS 


Introduction 

Most of us are probably unfamiliar, 
and maybe even afraid, of the term 
‘ ‘ Level of Repair Analysis (LORA),’ ’ let 
alone why LORA is conducted or when 
it should be conducted. This article will 
alleviate some of these fears and explain 
why and when LORA is performed. 
The term LORA, as defined in AMC-R 
700-27, 20 Feb 9T LORA Program, is 
“an analytical method used to deter- 
mine the maintenance level at which an 
item should be replaced, repaired, or 
discarded.” In simpler terms, LORA 
determines the most cost effective 
maintenance concept of a system 
based on economic and non-economic 


By Nicholas R. Giordano 


factors. 

The term LORA is synonymous with 
Optimum Repair Level Analysis and 
Level of Repair as used in various other 
documents throughout the Depart- 
ment of the Army and Department of 
Defense. LORA has two key terms 
associated with it, LORA program and 
LORA process, which are also defined 
in AMC-R 700-27. The LORA program 
is associated with a specific hardware 
system or acquisition that establishes 
the procedures and actions necessary 
to ensure a cost effective program for 
determining the repair or discard of an 
item. The LORA process consists of 
seven steps, as depicted in Figure 1. 


The LORA Process 

The LORA process is shown as a con- 
tinuous loop because it is iterative in 
nature and must constantly be updated 
and revised as the system matures and 
better data becomes available. The for- 
mal definition of the LORA process, as 
defined in AMC-R 700-27, is “iterative 
evaluations, which arrive at level of 
repair/discard alternative(s) based on 
economic and noneconomic consider- 
ations.” Economic evaluations con- 
sider cost factors such as spare parts, 
transportation, inventories, labor, and 
training and performance factors such 
as mean time to repair (MTTR), opera- 
tional availability, and mean time be- 
tween failure (MTBF). 

Non-economic evaluations consider 
pre-emptive factors such as safety, 
vulnerability, mobility, policy, and 
manpower that restrict or constrain the 
maintenance level where repair or 
discard can be performed. 

Why LORA is Conducted 

As explained in the previous para- 
graph, the objective of LORA is to 
establish the most cost effective 
maintenance concept of a system. 
LORAs are to be conducted on every 
system acquisition program, as defined 
by AR 750-1 and AR 700-127. These 
regulations state that analytical tech- 
niques and models will be used to de- 
velop and evaluate alternative support 
concepts. The LORA program is con- 
ducted as an integral part of the Logistic 
Support Analysis (LSA) program, as 
defined in MIL-STD-1388-1A task 
303 2.7, Repair Level Analyses. 

Results of the LORA are used for four 
main purposes: to influence design (i.e. , 
discard versus repair); assist in assign- 
ment of the source, maintenance, and 
recoverability (SMR) codes; provide 
development and assignment of main- 
tenance tasks for establishment of the 
Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC); 
and assist in development of technical 
manuals. 

Systems being developed for Army 
use, including joint service systems 
with the Army as lead, are regulated by 
AMC-R 700-27, which establishes the 
U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) 
objectives and policies and assigns 
responsibilities for a LORA program 
throughout all phases of a materiel 
system’s life cycle. 


38 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 



PLAN LORA 
EFFORT 


PREPARE 

LORA 

PROGRAM 

PLAN 


COMPILE 

INPUT 

DATA 

PERFORMANCE 

COSTS 

PRE-EMPTIVE 

FACTORS 

DESIGN 

MAINTENANCE 

CONCEPTS 



PERFORM 

NONECONOMIC 

EVALUATIONS 


IDENTIFY 
CONSTRAINTS 
IMPOSED ON 
THE SYSTEM 




UTILIZE 

RESULTS 


INCORPORATE 
INTO ILS 
PRODUCTS 
AND FEED TO 
OTHER LSA 
RELATED 
ANALYSES 


ANALYZE AND 
DOCUMENT 
RESULTS 


PREPARE FORMAL 
LORA REPORT 


LORA 

REPORT 


IMPROVED 

HIGH 

FREQUENCY 

RADIO 




} 




When to Perform a LORA 

Although LORA is required by AR 
750-1, AR 700-127, and AMC-R 700-27 
and is applicable to all system acquisi- 
tion programs, it should be tailored to 
fit the requirements of the individual 
system or equipment program. There- 
fore, “when” and to “what extent” 
LORA is performed is just as important 
as why LORA is performed. 

As mentioned previously, LORA is 
iterative in nature and, therefore, is ap- 
plicable to all phases of a system's life 
cycle. However, the system's life cycle 
phase will affect the extent of the 
analysis, or the scope of the LORA pro- 
gram and tailoring should be con- 
ducted to keep resource requirements 
at a minimum. A brief explanation of 
what LORA accomplishes and why it 
is performed in each phase of the life 
cycle is provided in Figure 2. 

In the early phases (i.e., Concept/ 
Exploration and Demonstration/ 
Validation) the main purpose of a LORA 
is to direct the design of the system 
from a supportability standpoint. The 
design is usually still very flexible and 
allows the best opportunity for con- 
ducting tradeoffs, identifying alter- 
natives, and directing design from a 
supportability standpoint. This 


Figure 1. 

Seven Steps of the LORA Process. 

includes determining items and parts 
that should be clearly designed for 
discard instead of being repaired. Also, 
the LORA may be used to evaluate ear- 
ly considerations of support equipment 
requirements (i.e., built-in-test versus 
automatic test equipment) and man- 
power and skill requirements. 

The LORA also can be used in the 
early phases to establish early re- 
quirements of initial provisioning, in- 
cluding spare parts and test equipment, 
which can assist in development of 
budgets and funding levels for the lat- 
ter stages. 

The next two phases, Full Scale 
Development and Production/ Deploy- 
ment, usually allow less design 
freedom. LORAs are usually conducted 
in these phases to establish the optimal 
support and maintenance structure of 
a system and assist in developing the 
SMR codes and MAC. A LORA is also ap- 
plicable to fielded systems and is con- 
ducted to assess the current mainte- 
nance structure of the system. Fielded 
system LORAs should be conducted 
when there is a dramatic increase or 
decrease in the cost or failure rate of an 
item, when an engineering change pro- 
posal is submitted or implemented, 
when considering changing from total 


contractor support to organic support, 
or as part of a scheduled fielded system 
review. 

Other factors that may affect the ex- 
tent of the LORA program are: type of 
acquisition program or strategy (e.g., 
non-development, and product im- 
provement program); amount of design 
freedom; resources; schedule, and 
availability of data. Since these factors 
also affect the extent of the LORA, the 
overall tailoring process should corres- 
pond to the size, complexity, and life 
cycle phase of the individual system or 
equipment program to reduce the 
resources required. 

Sources and Reliability 
of Input Data 

Since LORA is an analytical tech- 
nique, input data is required to conduct 
the LORA evaluations (economic and 
non-economic) and collection of this 
data is usually a major task of the LORA 
process. Data is available from many 
sources and includes: LSA Record; 
MRSA’s Logistics Parameter Library; 
other system engineering analyses and 
programs (i.e. , transportation analysis, 
safety assessment, and reliability pro- 
gram); and historical data bases such as 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 39 


from existing and similar systems, and 
from LORAs previously conducted on 
similar and existing systems. 

In the early phases of the life cycle, 
data may be based on engineering 
estimates, such as MTBF and MTTR, 
that could be unreliable. Therefore, 
sensitivity analysis will have to be con- 
ducted to assess how variations in these 
LORA input parameters affect the base- 
line maintenance concept and reduce 
associated risks. Initial input data values 
are used to establish an initial baseline 
maintenance concept. 

After establishing the baseline con- 
cept, a sensitivity analysis is per- 
formed. The purpose is to: determine 
if variations in the selected input 
parameters would result in assignment 
of different repair levels; assess the 
effect on the total life cycle cost; and 
determine if any alternative mainte- 
nance concept would be more eco- 
nomical. Sensitivity analysis involves 
the following steps: identify and select 
the LORA input data elements to be 
analyzed; establish a numerical range(s) 
over which the selected data element(s) 
is expected to fall within; execute the 
LORA model/technique over the 
established numerical range(s); assess 


the impact on the baseline maintenance 
concept based on total cost and repair 
level designation; and, verify or change 
the recommended maintenance con- 
cept based on the results. 

As mentioned previously, LORA is an 
iterative process and is continuously 
updated and revised as the system 
matures. Therefore, as more reliable 
data becomes available, the LORA will 
be updated and revised to reflect the 
most current values of the input 
parameters. This process results in the 
most cost effective maintenance con- 
cept based on the most current infor- 
mation and LORA input data. 

Utilization of the 
LORA Results 

Results of the LORA will be used to 
direct design and assist in development 
of the maintenance structure. Early 
results of the LORA indicate items that 
can be discarded at failure and sepa- 
rated from those that are to be repaired. 
This assists in establishing early SMR 
codes for provisioning. Results should 
also be analyzed and put into the form 
of recommended actions to be given to 
the equipment designer to affect the 


design. Later in the life cycle, the results 
are used to propose the maintenance 
concept for the system. This includes 
documenting the results in the 
Logistics Support Analysis Record (e.g., 
SMR codes, repair levels, test equip- 
ment requirements). The results are 
then used in formulating the MAC and 
in developing the technical manuals. 
The results also provide estimates of 
the life cycle costs of supporting the 
system, which can be used to establish 
funding requirements for spares, test 
equipment, and manpower. 

Examples of LORAs 

MRSA, as the Army LORA support of- 
fice, has performed numerous LORAs 
on both developmental and fielded 
systems. Examples of developmental 
systems include: Pedestal Mounted 
Stinger; Air-to-Air Stinger; and Ml Laser 
Range Finder. Fielded system examples 
include: Improved High Frequency 
Radio (IHFR); and Aviator’s Night Vi- 
sion Imaging System. 

The IHFR is a good example of how 
a fielded system LORA can assess the 
current maintenance structure of a 
system and recommend alternatives 


CONCEPT/ 

EXPLORATION 

DISCARD 

DEMONSTRATION/ ! 

VALIDATION 

INFLUENCE DESIGN/ 
SUPPORTABILITY 

ANALYZE GENERAL 
CONCEPTS BASED 
UPON ENGINEERING 
STUDIES, EVALUATIONS, 
HISTORICAL DATA, AND 
EXPERT OPINION. 

\ / 

CONDUCT/ \ 
UPDATE j 

LORA 

ASSISTS IN ESTABLISHING 
MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS, 
AND COST EFFECTIVE 
RELIABILITY AND 
TESTABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS. 

IDENTIFY ITEMS WHICH 
ARE TO BE 

DESIGNED FOR DISCARD. 


OPERATION & 
SUPPORT 


ASSESSES 

CURRENT 

MAINTENANCE 

STRUCTURE 


\ 



PRODUCTION/ 

DEPLOYMENT 


ASSISTS IN 
FINALIZATION OF 
THE SMR CODES, 
MAC, AND TMs. 
EVALUATIONS 
ASSESS ECPs/PIPs. 


FULL-SCALE 

DEVELOPMENT 


PERFORM NONECONOMIC 
AND ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS 
TO OPTIMIZE THE SUPPORT 
STRUCTURE AND DETERMINE 
AN OPTIMAL MAINTENANCE 
CONCEPT. 


Figure 2. 

The LORA Process During the Life Cycle. 


40 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


Table 1-1. 

Summary of the Repair Levels and O&S Cost. 





TOTAL O&S COST 


RECOMMENDED 

CURRENT 

RECOMMENDED 

CURRENT 

SYSTEM 

POLICY 

POLICY 

POLICY 

POLICY 

CONFIGURATION 

(LORA) 

(MAC) 

(LORA) 

(MAC) 

AN/PRC-104A 





End Items 

DS level 

ORG 



Components 

DS level 

GS 

S22.77M 

$30.45M 

Modules 

6 at GS, 

1 at DS, 

1 at DEP, and 
1 for discard 

DEP 



AN/GRC-213 





End Items 

DS level 

ORG 



i Components 
! Modules 

DS level 
6 at GS, 

GS 

2 at GS, 

S32.57M 

$43.09M j 


6 at DS 

10 at DEP 



AN/GRC-193A 





End Items 

DS level 

ORG 



Components 

Modules 

DS level 
23 at DS, and 
12 for Discard 

GS 

DEP 

$106. 59M 

$170. 76M 


NOTE: ORG - Organizational; DS - Direct Support; GS - General Support; DEP - Depot 


that result in significant savings in 
operating and support (O&S) costs. The 
IHFR is a family of radios with three 
configurations (AN/PRC-104A, man- 
pack; AN/GRC-213, vehicular pack 
with low power; and AN/GRC-193A, 
vehicular pack with high power). The 
LORA analyzed each configuration 
separately and resulted in significant 
savings over the current maintenance 
structure, as stated in the MAC. Table 1-1 
shows the recommended repair levels 
as a result of the LORA versus the cur- 
rent repair levels stated in the MAC. The 
table also indicates the total O&S cost 
for the recommended policy versus the 
current policy (MAC). 

As shown in Table 1-1, the potential 
savings over the life of the system (20 
years), if the recommended policies are 
implemented, would be approximate- 
ly: $7.8M for the AN/PRC-104A; 
$10. 5M for the AN/GRC-213; and 
$64. 1M for the AN/GRC-193A. The 
greatest savings were realized from a 
decrease in initial spares and inventory 
holding costs. The recommended 
policy for each configuration was to 
repair the end item utilizing a direct 


support (DS) contact team, which is in- 
dicated as DS in Table 1-1. It is more 
economical to move repair of most of 
the components and modules forward. 

Currently, the components are being 
repaired at general support and depot. 
On the AN/GRC-193A configuration, 
12 of the 23 modules were recom- 
mended for discard at failure, which 
also contributed to the overall cost sav- 
ings. The results and recommendations 
in the IHFR’s LORA report are current- 
ly being reviewed by the program 
manager (PM) Single Channel Ground 
and Airborne Radio System. The PM 
has also indicated that the results and 
recommendations of the LORA will be 
used to reevaluate the maintenance 
concept and update and revise the MAC 
and SMR codes. 

Conclusion 

The LORA and LORA program are 
important tools the Army can use to get 
the greatest value from its equipment. 
The two key points of this article are: 
LORA’s purpose is to establish the most 
cost effective maintenance concept of 


a system; and the LORA process is 
iterative in nature and, therefore, is ap- 
plicable to all phases of the life cycle. 
For more information on LORA and the 
LORA program, contact the USAMC 
Materiel Readiness Support Activity at 
DSN 745-3963 or commercial (606) 
293-3963- Our mailing address is: 
Commander, USAMC Materiel Readi- 
ness Support Activity, ATTN: AMXMD- 
EL, Lexington, KY 40511-5101. 


NICHOLAS R. GIORDANO is a 
senior engineer in the Logistics 
Engineering Branch of the USAMC 
Materiel Readiness Support Activi- 
ty. He holds a bachelor's degree 
in mechanical engineering from 
Florida Atlantic University, a 
master's degree in business ad- 
ministration from East Texas State 
University, and is graduate of the 
USAMC Maintainability Engineer- 
ing Program. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 41 


TACOM 
DEVELOPS Ml 
MINE CLEARING ROBOT 


The U S. Army Tank-Automotive Com- 
mand’s (TACOM) Research, Development 
and Engineering Center, Warren, MI, has 
developed and demonstrated a remote- 
controlled mine-clearing vehicle that may 
someday eliminate much of the danger 
soldiers face when encountering mine- 
fields. Such a vehicle would accompany 
assault forces and clear a path through 
minefields for other vehicles by using a V- 
shaped, track-width mine plow to push 
mines off to either side. 

The Army currently does not have in its 
inventory a vehicle specifically designated 
for mine-clearing. Assault vehicle crews 
have had to rely mainly on combat 
engineers using hand-held metal detectors 
and bayonets to locate minefields, and 
manned Ml-series tanks equipped with 
track-width mine plows to breach them. 

A mine-clearing vehicle is now under 
development as part of the Army’s Armored 
Systems Modernization Program, but it is 
not planned for introduction until the year 
2004. So late last December, with the Per- 
sian Gulf War drawing near, the Army asked 
TACOM ’s RDE Center to design and build 
a remote control system capable of guiding 
an Ml equipped with a mine plow through 
minefields. 

The request was a tough one to meet 
because the Army wanted the system in only 
eight weeks. Other requirements were that 
it be small, easy to install, and use transmit- 
ters and receivers already in the field. The 
center’s Design and Manufacturing Tech- 
nology Directorate not only met the re- 
quirements but completed the design, fab- 
rication, installation and testing of a proto- 
type system in five weeks. Fortunately, the 
war was over by then, but the system is 
available for use in future conflicts, and we 
believe it could be applied to other combat 
vehicles in addition to the Ml. 

The system is designed to be compatible 
with all current U.S. military radios now 
in use — the SINCGARS (Single-Channel 
Ground-to-Air Radio System) and the older 
style VRC-12 and PRC-77 series radios. It 
consists of two parts — the transmitter in- 
terface (TI) and the receiver interface (RI). 
The TI is a control box 8-inches by 6-inches 
by 5-inches which the operator uses to drive 
the robot vehicle from a safe distance in a 
control vehicle. 

The receiver interface is a shoebox-size 
unit that is mounted in the robot vehicle. 


By John J. Schmitz 
and George Taylor 


It executes the driver’s commands by elec- 
tronically actuating any of several elec- 
tromechanical actuators and electric relays 
that control braking, acceleration, steering 
and other driving functions, as well as rais- 
ing and lowering of the mine plow. 

In operation, the operator enters a com- 
mand into the transmitter interface to, say, 
stop the vehicle, and a circuit board feeds 
appropriate electronic signals into the con- 
trol vehicle’s radio. This radio in turn 
transmits the signals to the robot vehicle 
radio, which feeds them into a microproc- 
essor inside the receiver interface. The 
microprocessor then analyzes the data and 
generates a signal to activate the actuator 
that controls the vehicle’s brakes. 

The power requirement for the transmit- 
ter interface is about 200 milliamperes at 12 
volts. Currently, the unit is powered by a 
gelled-cell battery that can provide 20 hours 
of operation between recharges, but it could 
be wired to receive power from the vehi- 
cle’s electrical system. 

The transmitter interface contains six 
switches, but is capable of inputing up to 
28 switches. The switches interface with the 
microprocessor in a matrix pattern, which 
is adaptable to various needs. The interface 
pads are already installed to accept new 
switches. The transmitter interface has a 
two-axis control stick, and can handle up 
to two control sticks. The control stick is 
connected to an analog-to-digital converter 
which is controlled by the microprocessor. 

The microprocessor collects switch and 
control-stick inputs and transmits this in- 
formation at 1299 Baud in both digital and 
tone outputs. The digital output is compati- 
ble with SINCGARS, hardwire, and com- 
puter ports. The tone output is compatible 
with analog media such as the VRC-12 and 
PRC-77 radios and land lines. 

The receiver interface, which is also set 
up to handle both digital and tone signals, 
can be installed in an Ml in less than an hour 
by two people without special tools. Con- 
version from manual to remote operation 
of the Ml requires about two minutes and 
can be accomplished from the driver’s com- 
partment. The RI mounts in the hull just 


behind the driver’s seat. 

The main circuit board of the receiver in- 
terface contains 14 relays. The gear select 
in the Ml is controlled via five relays, (which 
are part of the 14 relays on the main board) 
and is connected to the transmission cable, 
located on the back of the T-bar. Master 
panel functions, such as engine start and 
stop, are also performed with relays and are 
connected through the master panel test 
jack. 

There are currently seven unused relays, 
and they can be used for any user function 
as required, with no change to the main 
board. The receiver interface has four pro- 
portional outputs. These outputs drive ac- 
tuator control cards which in turn control 
electromechanical actuators. The current 
system uses two such actuators, one to 
operate the service brakes and another to 
control the steering. The brake actuator is 
mounted on the left wall of the driver’s 
compartment, just below the brake cable. 
It is connected to the brake lever at the end 
of the cable and allows full movement of the 
brake pedal at all times. 

The steering actuator is mounted on the 
ceiling of the driver’s compartment, just 
behind the T-bar. It is attached to the T-bar 
by a bracket mounted on the T-bar grip and 
is easily removed by a quick-release pin. 
Another output of the main board is a 
variable amplitude triangle wave, which 
controls the Ml throttle. 

The system performed very well in tests 
conducted at TACOM. However, with 
Operational Desert Storm having reached 
a successful conclusion, it is not likely that 
the system will end up in the hands of 
troops any time soon. Despite this, however, 
we are continuing to improve the design, 
as well as looking for alternative uses — 
knowing that such a system has the poten- 
tial of playing an important role in future 
military confrontations. 


JOHN J. SCHMITZ is an electrical 
engineer in the Design and Manufac- 
turing Technology Directorate, Army 
Tank-Automotive Command RDE 
Center. 

GEORGE TAYLOR is a technical 
writer for the U.S. Army Tank- 
Automotive Command. 


42 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 


RD&A NEWS BRIEFS 


DOD to Create 
New Simulation Office 

Editor’s Note: Reprint Courtesy of Defense News 
Copyright by Times Journal Publishing Company 
Springfield, Virginia 

In a long-awaited development, the U.S. Department of 
Defense is moving ahead with plans to establish a Defense 
Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) to coordinate the 
military services’ disparate simulation efforts. 

Approved June 21 by Donald Atwood, deputy defense 
secretary, the new office is intended to support the 
undersecretary of defense for acquisition “in strengthen- 
ing the use of modeling and simulation in joint education 
and training, research and development, test and evaluation, 
and operations and cost analysis,” Atwood states in a 
memorandum. 

DMSO will serve as a coordinating office that will sup- 
port an Executive Council for Models and Simulations (EX- 
CIMS) also being established under the new management 
plan. 

Composed of representatives from each military service, 
EXCIMS will advise the defense acquisition chief on model- 
ing and simulation issues, such as instituting standards and 
developing funding strategies to improve simulation tech- 
nologies, according to the Defense Modeling and Simula- 
tion Management Plan. EXCIMS also will submit a biennial 
report to Pentagon acquisition officials detailing the group’s 
achievements and areas that require greater attention or 
funding. 

Exactly who will take part in EXCIMS remains to be deter- 
mined, Pentagon officials say. However, Army COL Ed Fitz- 
simmons, recently director of training policy in the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management 
and Personnel, has been named to head DMSO. 

Specifically, the DMSO will undertake the following ac- 
tivities: 

• Develop policies to increase the attention focused on 
modeling and simulation in joint education and training, 
research and development, test and evaluation, and opera- 
tions and cost analysis. 

• Oversee the distribution of approved modeling and 
simulation guidelines to the individual services to assist them 
in developing their own simulation plans. 

• Develop a liaison process to coordinate and assist in 
the development, acquisition and sharing of modeling and 
simulation technology and standards among the military 
services and the defense industry. 

• Develop approved means to increase cooperation 
among the military services to maximize modeling and 
simulation interoperability while eliminating duplicative 
development of advanced modeling and simulation 
technologies. 

• Advise the Pentagon acquisition chief on matters 
relating to improving the use of modeling and simulation 
that supports the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 


Defense Planning and Resources Board and the Defense Ac- 
quisition Board. 

Funded with $75 million that Congress provided in the 
Pentagon’s 1991 budget, DMSO will move over the next 
month to establish working groups that will begin to address 
outstanding issues in the areas of standards, interoperabili- 
ty and technology. 

Pentagon training officials emphasize, however, that the 
new office will refrain from telling the individual military 
services how to manage or operate their own training and 
simulation programs. Instead, DMSO will focus on ways to 
improve the acquisition of modeling and simulation systems 
and cut costs by eliminating redundant equipment and buy- 
ing more commercially available products, officials say. 

The formation of DMSO has generated widespread con- 
cern throughout the simulation and training industry as 
companies have feared the potential bureaucratic power the 
new organization could wield. However, since DMSO will 
not be an advocate for the acquisition of particular training 
systems, most industry concerns will be alleviated, Pentagon 
officials say. 

In directing the establishment of such an office in the 1991 
budget, Congress was particularly interested in establishing 
standards for modeling and simulation systems and increas- 
ing the interoperability of individual service systems. 

While DMSO meets congressional aims, questions still ex- 
ist about the technical expertise and support the new of- 
fice will possess, a Senate source says. Noting that DMSO 
is envisioned as only a seven- person office, the source said 
“where do they go to get unbiased help to proceed with 
establishing new protocols?” 

Water Purification Equipment 
Field Tested Under Fire 

The war in the Persian Gulf forced the trial-by-fire in the 
early fielding of many equipment items. Water purifiers were 
among those pieces of equipment fielded early and tested 
under actual combat conditions. 

Adequate potable water is important for survival in any 
environment, but it was critical in the harsh desert climate 
of Southwest Asia. 

“The Army had adequate water purification support in 
Southwest Asia. Skid units with a 150,000 gallon-per-day 
purification capacity and barges with a capacity for 300,000 
gallons-per-day were used for general support and 600 
gallons-per-hour units provided division support. What was 
needed was a 3 ,000 gallon-per-hour machine for corps sup- 
port to fill in the gap,” said SGM Thomas Rosenthal of the 
Petroleum and Water Logistics Office, U.S. Army Troop Sup- 
port Command. 

The Troop Support Command (TROSCOM), commonly 
known as “The Soldier’s Command,” is in charge of the 
research, development, fielding and maintenance of a wide 
range of equipment items including operational rations, 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 43 




RD&A NEWS BRIEFS 


clothing, shelters, camouflage, mine detection and clearing 
equipment, watercraft, power generation, air delivery equip- 
ment and fuel handling and storage equipment. 

The Army uses a three-step process to purify water. 
Regardless of whether the water began as brackish or salt 
water, all impurities and contaminants, including chemical 
and biological agents are removed. The end product is water 
that is much cleaner than the tap-water in most households. 

First, the water is passed through a multi-media filter 
which removes the majority of the particles. Then it is forced 
through cartridge filters which remove the remaining par- 
ticles. Finally, it goes through the reverse osmosis element 
which rejects the ions, allowing only pure water to pass. 

TROSCOM’s Project Office for Petroleum and Water 
Logistics had previously recognized the requirement for an 
intermediate capacity reverse osmosis water purification unit 
(ROWPU), and had been developing it for some time. Opera- 
tion Desert Shield created an ideal situation to field test this 
new unit. 

TROSCOM arranged to have three 3,000 GPH prototype 
ROWPUs air-lifted to Southwest Asia in October due to the 
need for a mobile intermediate range machine. Item 
managers also hoped to determine from this move if the 
length of the test cycle could be cut by field trials. 

“Our results for purifying fresh well water were very 
promising. The units were easy to operate and made good 
water,” said Rosenthal. 

The 82d Quartermaster Detachment, Fort Irwin, CA., 
trained on the units and ran them during the war at King 
Khalid Military City (KKMC) and Log Base Charlie in Saudi 
Arabia. The units purified two and a half million gallons of 
water of KKMC from October to January and eight million 
gallons at Log Base Charlie from mid-January through 
mid-April. 

“When the fighting stopped and the units were no longer 
needed in the northern part of the country we arranged for 
the 3K ROWPUs to be tested on sea water,’ ’ said COL Robert 
Weimer, TROSCOM’s project manager for petroleum and 
water logistics. 

“The units worked well on sea water but the high salt con- 
tent did cause problems,” said SFC Ronald Allen of the 82d 
Quartermaster Detachment. 

“When you operate on sea water, maintenance time more 
than doubles. The salt content in the Arabian Gulf is two 
and a half times that of normal sea water so we figured this 
would be the best place to test the units,” said Allen. 

The 82d ran the sea water test 24 hours a day, seven days 
a week for two weeks. The test data was then forwarded to 
the project manager to complement first article test data 
already collected. 

“Overall we are very pleased with the operation of the 
3K ROWPU. It is a very positive addition to our existing fami- 
ly of water purification equipment,” Weimer said. 


Development 
of The 

Maneuver Control System 

Thanks to the foresight of a project manager who used 
an evolutionary approach in developing the Maneuver Con- 
trol System, a number of Army commanders in Operation 
Desert Storm were provided with the most current bat- 
tlefield information. 

The Maneuver Control System is an integrated network 
of computers that helps commanders and their staffs at the 
corps, division, brigade and battalion levels manage infor- 
mation used in executing the commander’s concept of 
operations. 

“Our original purpose in using the ‘evolutionary’ 
approach — which means to field now and refine later — ’’said 
COL James T. Doyle, the project manager for Operations Tac- 
tical Data Systems, who managed the development and ac- 
quisition of the system, “was to get the system out to the 
field early so we could get user feedback to influence the 
system’s design and features, plus to give the force exper- 
tise in using it.” As it turns out, another benefit of that ap- 
proach was that it gave some Desert Storm commanders a 
tool to analyze and disseminate crucial planning informa- 
tion on U.S. forces, Iraqi forces, and battlefield 
characteristics — a tool that otherwise wouldn’t have been 
available for some years. 

How does the system help a commander? It puts bat- 
tlefield information at commanders’ fingertips. 

The Maneuver Control System, which employs software 
written in the DOD standard software language of ADA, is 
not a stand-alone system. Essentially, what it does is inter- 
face with command and control systems such as the Ad- 
vanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System and the Combat 
Service Support Control System, and integrate information 
in its five databases. These databases are friendly forces; 
enemy forces; control measures; obstacle barriers; and 
nuclear, biological, and chemical data. 

The system can display that information in the form of 
charts, reports, maps, or spreadsheets, which users can zoom 
in on, scroll, or print. Then, with one keystroke, users can 
transmit the data to up to 35 preprogrammed addresses, sav- 
ing time on faxing or other means of distributing informa- 
tion. The transmit feature is particularly helpful in the case 
of map overlays, which can be transmitted and then viewed 
on screens by recipients. 

Before the Maneuver Control System, maps would most 
often be prepared as mapboards — which are about 4-feet by 
8-feet, or about the size of a sheet of plywood or sheetrock — 
which would have to be painstakingly duplicated, and then 
loaded on vehicles to be distributed by messengers to various 
sites — a labor-intensive proposition. 

Another important Maneuver Control System feature is 
the automatic replication of database information. That 
feature insures that if a node at one level goes down, or if 
a node has to shut down to be moved to another location, 


44 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 




RD&A NEWS BRIEFS 


its database information is not lost — it has automatically 
been replicated onto selected other nodes and can be ac- 
cessed from them — thus achieving continuity of operations, 
or CONOPS in military terminology. 

Evolutionary Approach 

The evolutionary approach used to develop the Maneuver 
Control System placed an initial version of the system in the 
field at the front end, with refinements evolving as the 
system is used in the field. This differs from the typical five 
to 20 year development cycle for Army materiel where first 
concepts are proven, prototypes are developed and tested, 
and then production models are manufactured and field- 
ed. The system is being developed in four blocks, represen- 
ting a further evolution. 

Block one called for the development, to military 
specifications, of a tactical computer terminal; some soft- 
ware; 16 preformatted messages; the capability to transmit 
and receive standing requests for information; process 
queries from remote nodes; and transmit data to up to 35 


preprogrammed addresses. This block was completed in late 
1988 . 

Block two, which is currently being completed, will add 
commercial off-the-shelf items such as an Analyst’s Console 
and a Tactical Computer Processor. Also included, will be 
the ability to transmit data via Mobile Subscriber Equipment 
and the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 
as well as over commercial telephone lines. 

Block three, by late 1992, will add the ability to interface 
with other systems of the Army Tactical Command and Con- 
trol System and will include new hardware and software 
from the Army’s Common Hardware and Software Project. 
In addition, enhanced Maneuver Control System software, 
which is more user friendly, will be added. Also, the “mil 
spec” Tactical Computer Terminal and the Analyst’s Con- 
sole and Tactical Computer Processor hardware will be 
replaced. 

Block four will provide software enhancements and more 
capabilities and will add additional common hardware 
devices such as the Lightweight Computer Unit and the 
Handheld Transportable Unit. 


‘You Get What You Pay For’ 

After speaking at the 25th annual DOD Cost Analysis Sym- 
posium, Stephen K. Conver, the Army Acquisition Executive, 
was approached by a British gentleman who gave him a 
quote he had handwritten on a scrap of paper. Mr. Conver 
agreed that his message could not have been stated more elo- 
quently, and he asked the Bulletin to share the quote with 
you: 

“It’s unwise to pay too much, 
but it’s worse to pay too little. 

When you pay too much, 

you lose a little money— that is all. 

When you pay too little, 
you sometimes lose everything 
because the thing you bought 
was incapable of doing the thing 
it was bought to do. 

The common law of business balance 
prohibits paying a little and 
getting a lot— it can’t be done. 

If you deal with the lowest bidder, 
it’s well to add something for the 
risk you run, and if you do that, 
you will have enough to pay for 
something better.” 

John Ruskin 
1819-1900 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 45 




LETTERS 


Dear Sir: 

I have been a reader of the Bulletin and its predecessor 
ever since I was Deputy for Laboratories to the CGs of AMC 
from 1968 to 1976. The publication has been a useful tie 
to the continuing R&D developments in the Army, and has 
allowed me to follow developments which I helped initiate. 

However, in my opinion you have missed the mark in your 
stated attempt in the July/August edition to review 50 years 
of Army R&D. You failed to identify the significant contribu- 
tions of early Army scientists such as Harry Diamond and 
the proximity fuze, Henry Kalmus the second greatest pa- 
tent holder in U.S. Government history and inventor of the 
Kalmus filter, Ray Bowles and fluidities plus the founder of 
the Ballistics Research Lab to name just a few. You have 
overlooked the fact that the Army R&D accomplishments 
are anchored in individual commitment and genius, not a 
faceless organization. 

This failure to recognize that talent and continuity are key 
factors leading to R&D success is exemplified in your two 
articles in the July /August issue depicting the Missile Com- 
mand. In developing the article around MG Chen, the cur- 
rent CG, and a selection of recently fielded weapons, you 
have totally ignored the work of the laboratory and its key 
role in proving the feasibility and in developing these 
weapons systems carried out over the last two decades. I 
do not mean to take away from General Chen, who has a 
proven technical background based on his successful educa- 
tion at the University of Michigan. I received similar degrees 
there 47 years ago. However, the developments of the 
systems cited were due to the vision and talents of the Missile 
lab during the time Dr. John McDaniel was technical direc- 
tor. As a matter of fact “Big ” John and I decided to initiate 
the MLRS proof of feasibility while flying to Huntsville in 
a U-21 in 1973 The system was to be as a low cost, accurate, 
proliferation answer to the Russian Organ Pipe. We started 
with money which became available when the OSD forced 
us to stop work on directed energy weapon research due 
to the Navy out politicking the Army. Although very suc- 
cessful, the MLRS, as often happens, grew in complexity and 
cost from our initial concept. 

In another interesting bit of the history of technology, in 
the early ’70s, I brought together Dr. McDaniel and 
Optelcom, a new fledgling company doing research in fiber 
optics, to explore the use of fiber optics for data transmis- 
sion and vehicle control of RPVs and missiles. This work was 
a key ingredient to the development of the FOGM feasibili- 
ty which was proven and a workable missile system 
developed under the leadership of Dr. McCorkle, the pres- 
ent Laboratory Technical Director. Optelcom is still work- 
ing with the missile laboratory. The command leadership 
you cite had nothing to do with these key developments of 
enhanced Army fighting capability because they weren’t on 
the scene at the time. 

Similarly, you omitted a large amount of key pertinent 
laboratory technical recognition in the article describing the 
new Air Defense PEO and his program responsibilities, 
which should be included in an R&D bulletin. All the systems 
cited are based on past laboratory developments. 


I would have thought that you might have mentioned 
some of the outstanding helicopter research carried out by 
the Army Aviation Labs which are collocated with NASA. 
The research on large lift blade technology carried out by 
the Ames lab in the full scale wind tunnel led to the XV-15 
and the current V-22 program. The concept was the brain- 
child of the lab director in the early 70’s. 

Also, from the historical and scientific contribution 
perspective, I was surprised you omitted mention of Dr. John 
Weiss, Director of the Human Engineering Lab for the last 
34 years and Dr. Ben Harris who spent his career from WW 
II to his retirement, as Technical Director of the Chemical 
Lab in the early 1980 ’s working to enhance the Army posi- 
tion in all aspects of Chemical Warfare. 

I would like to see the bulletin try and concentrate more 
fully on spreading the work concerning the R&D activities 
and accomplishments of interest to the R&D community. 
With help from the numerous retired former leaders of Ar- 
my R&D still available, you should be able to develop an 
outstanding issue on the great technical contributions of the 
Army technical community over its past lifetime. 

Sincerely yours, 

Dr. R. B. Dillaway 


Army RD&A Bulletin Responds: 

Thank you for your insightful letter regarding these three 
articles in our July-August issue. We are sorry you feel we 
“missed the mark” with these articles but would like to offer 
a few words of explanation which may clarify our intent in 
publishing them: The article on 50 years of Army R&D 
achievement is a condensation of a new book distributed 
by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Research and Technology. The intent, as stated by the 
author, was to provide an overview of some key techno- 
logical achievements based on their relevance to military 
needs, and their contributions to society as a whole. These 
achievements, unquestionably, would not have been possi- 
ble without the dedicated efforts of people — the backbone 
of any successful endeavor. In this case, the people are Army 
scientists and engineers. Failure to pay tribute to them should 
in no way be construed as an attempt to downgrade their 
importance. 

The intent of the articles on the Army Missile Command 
and the PEO for Air Defense was to familiarize our readers 
with key RD&A organizations and leaders. Unfortunately, 
space limitations of this continuing series preclude detail- 
ed discussions of past laboratory developments and leaders. 
Again, this should not be interpreted as an attempt to 
denigrate their importance. 


46 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 



SPEAKING OUT 


What Suggestions Do You Have 
for Improving Cooperative R&D Efforts 
Between the U.S. and Its Allies? 


BG Joseph Raffianijr. 

Deputy for Program Assessment 
for International Cooperation 
Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of the Army (Research, 

Development and Acquisition) 

Cooperative R&D efforts, by their very 
nature, are difficult to initiate, formulate, 
and execute. The key is obtaining long 
term support from Army, OSD, and Con- 
gress. The kind of support required transcends budget fluc- 
tuations and personnel turnover. This means that an inter- 
national project must address fundamental military 
requirements in each nation, that planning begins prior to 
selecting final concepts or contractors, and that the project 
has the priority to be funded in the POM and compete 
favorably for future funding. Additionally, the project has 
to be given the same management emphasis, within the ac- 
cepted PEO/PM structure, as domestic programs. Managing 
international programs “off-line” simply does not work. 

The above formula does not guarantee success because 
these factors, plus others, will be debated in all participating 
nations, for different reasons and at different milestones. To 
reduce the impact of these debates on the project leads one 
to recognize the need to limit the number of participating 
nations and, accordingly, the number of contractors. 


LTC David W. Andrews 
British Liaison Officer 
Headquarters, Army Materiel 

Command 

Allies must have clear visibility of each 
other’s military needs and how our 
RD&A programs will meet these needs. 

Windows of opportunity will appear 
when two or more nations need to 
replace or upgrade systems within the 
same timescale. If timescales don’t exactly match, that will 
not matter, these can be harmonized. Whenever possible, 
we need to throw across a bridge between similar projects. 
It would help if we could agree on a standard RD&A pat- 
tern. We must commit full and proper funding up front in 
order to prevent downstream fiscal ‘ ‘glitches.’ ’ We must also 
build flexibility into our programs to let other nations “buy- 
in” as our programs develop and expand . Finally, let us aim 
for production sharing in successful RD&A areas because 
it makes military expenditure more acceptable when it 
generates jobs at home. 


Michael F. Fissette 
Assistant Deputy for International 
Cooperative Programs 
Headquarters, Army Materiel 
Command 

First, we must have recognition and 
reinforcement by senior DOD and Army 
leadership regarding the essential nature 
of cooperative R&D. Coalition warfare 
is obviously crucial, but this takes 
interoperability of equipment, especially C3, consumables 
and spares. Reduced budgets and increasing global com- 
petitiveness in dual use technologies also need to be 
recognized as factors demanding cooperation. R&D 
cooperation supports strong alliances and results in the best 
equipment for our soldier with financial burdensharing 
reducing our costs. 

To improve cooperation, however, we must recognize ex- 
isting technology transfer issues and must deal with them 
early. Additionally, I believe four considerations are essen- 
tial to a cooperative strategy. First, we must apply total quali- 
ty management concepts to streamline existing procedures. 
For example, current mechanisms for staffing loans or 
Memoranda of Agreement, are too stifling. Second, we must 
start cooperation early by harmonizing requirements and 
developing cooperative ventures in the technology base. 
Third, we must encourage industry-to-industry cooperation. 
Many of our systems are developed by prime-subcontractor 
teams. We need an industry constituency and they need to 
think globally and work with government in a synergistic 
manner. Finally, we need to understand the positive results 
of success stories rather than dwelling on a few visible 
troubled programs. Successes include programs like the NBC 
reconnaissance vehicle acquired from Germany and ex- 
cellent cooperation in chemical detectors and alarms with 
the UK and Canada and also with France. There are hun- 
dreds of positive exchanges at various levels with our allies 
and we must continually recognize the net value of the 
various international programs. 





November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 47 



SPEAKING OUT 


LTC Hans Melcher 
German Liaison Officer 
Headquarters, Army Materiel 

Command 

You can hear it everywhere: “With 
defense budgets shrinking, allied and 
friendly nations should work together 
and cooperate more closely!” But past 
years have shown the difficulties in 
conducting international projects in 
practice. What is it that stands in the way of international 
cooperation, and who are the cooperation killers? Well, here 
are a few examples: a misguided strive for national 
technological and economic independence; outdated 
restrictions in technology transfer; politicians and decision- 
makers identifying with their pork-barrel interests; pre- 
judices rooted in yesteryear’s concerns; and a fear that one 
partner might profit more from cooperation than the other. 

So how can international cooperative R&D efforts be im- 
proved? Fight the cooperation killers! This is a never-ending 
task for generations of Armaments Attaches and Liaison Of- 
ficers. But it also involves the tedious process of educational 
efforts. We invite and encourage the U.S. Army to participate 
more actively in the U.S.-German Scientist and Engineer Ex- 
change Program, because this program has a long-range 
potential for improving international cooperative efforts. 

In the current German-U.S. armaments relationship, we 
try to place more emphasis on cooperation in the arena of 
technologies, and the harmonization of military re- 
quirements, as a basis for mutually beneficial R&D 
cooperation. 


Bryant R. Dunetz 
President, Center for Industry 
Cooperation and Trade 
and former Assistant Deputy for 
International Cooperation 
Headquarters, Army Materiel 
Command 

The basic principles for R&D 
cooperation among the allies have not 
really changed in spite of drastic and 
unpredictable world changes and events in the last two years. 
Standardization, interoperability and conservation of scarce 
budgets will continue to be the main drivers. Desert Storm 
produced a compelling list of high priority requirements for 
cooperation. 

Unquestionably, while the U.S. technology in many areas 
ranks among the best in the world, it by no means is the on- 
ly good technology. Technology cooperation can stimulate 
beneficial competition and challenge our technologists to 
develop better solutions. For example, the Europeans have 
developed many technologically advanced solutions in the 
field of chemical defense and CW verification technologies. 
The U.S. has and should continue to benefit from these 
efforts. 

Improvements will be realized by: maintaining an ag- 
gressive and active program of scientific and technical ex- 
changes; monitoring developments in the foreign civil 
sector, particularly technology advances in the European 
community and Japan; and keeping the Army leadership ap- 
prised of these developments and how they can contribute 
to force requirements of the future. In my opinion, there are 
many opportunities for R&D cooperation. Selecting the ones 
that have a good chance of succeeding, however, is a dif- 
ficult endeavor. 




CAREER DEVELOPMENT UPDATE 


Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (P.L. 101-510) 


This is the second installment of extracts from the 
new legislation: 

“Subchapter I — General Authorities and Responsibilities 
Section 1705. DIRECTORS OF ACQUISITION CAREER 
MANAGEMENT IN THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS There 
shall be a Director of Acquisition Career Management for 
each military department within the office of the service 
acquisition executive to assist the executive in the perform- 
ance of his duties under this chapter. The Secretary of the 
Navy, acting through the service acquisition executive, may 
appoint separate directors for the Navy and the Marine 
Corps. Section 1706. ACQUISITION CAREER PROGRAM 


BOARDS 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT— The Secretary of each military 
department, acting through the service acquisition ex- 
ecutive, shall establish an acquisition career program board 
to advise the service acquisition executive in managing the 
accession, training, education, and career development of 
military and civilian personnel in the acquisition workforce 
and in selecting individuals for an Acquisition Corps under 
section 1731 of this title. 

(b) COMPOSITION OF BOARD. — Each acquisition career 
program board shall include the Director of Acquisition 
Career Management (or his representative), the Assistant 


48 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 






CAREER DEVELOPMENT UPDATE 


Secretary with responsibility for manpower (or his represen- 
tative), and the military and civilian senior officials with 
responsibility for personnel development in the various ac- 
quisition career fields. The service acquisition executive (or 
his representative) shall be the head of the board. 

(c) SUBORDINATE BOARDS.— The Secretary of a military 
department may establish a subordinate board structure in 
the department to which functions of the acquisition career 
program board may be delegated. 

Subchapter III — Acquisition Corps Section 1732. SELEC- 
TION CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES. 

(a) SELECTION CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES — 
Selection for membership in an Acquisition Corps shall be 
made in accordance with criteria and procedures establish- 
ed by the Secretary of Defense. Such criteria and procedures 
shall be in effect on and after October 1, 1993- 

(b) ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA — Except as provided in 
subsections (c) and (d), only persons who meet all of the 
following requirements may be considered for service in the 
Corps: 

(1) (A) In the case of an employee, the person must be 
currently serving in a position within grade GS-13 or above 
of the General Schedule (including any employee covered 
by chapter 34 of title 5). 

(B) In the case of a member of the armed forces, the 
person must be currently serving in the grade of major or, 
in the case of the Navy, lieutenant commander, or a higher 
grade. 

(C) In the case of an applicant for employment, the 
person must have experience in government or industry 
equivalent to the experience of a person in a position 
described in subparagraph (A) or (B), as validated by the ap- 
propriate career program management board. 

(2) The person must meet the educational requirements 
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. Such requirements, 
at a minimum, shall include both of the following: 

(A) A requirement that the person — 

(i) has received a baccalaureate degree at an ac- 
credited educational institution authorized to grant bac- 
calaureate degrees, or 

(ii) has been certified by the acquisition career pro- 
gram board of the employing military department as possess- 
ing significant potential for advancement to levels of greater 
responsibility and authority, based on demonstrated ana- 
lytical and decisionmaking capabilities, job performance, 
and qualifying experience. 

(B) A requirement that the person has completed — 

(i) at least 24 semester credit hours (or the 
equivalent) of study from an accredited institution of higher 
education from among the following disciplines: accoun- 
ting, business finance, law, contracts, purchasing, 
economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative 
methods, and organization and management, or 

(ii) at least 24 semester credit hours (or the 
equivalent) from an accredited institution of higher educa- 
tion in the person’s career field and 12 semester credit hours 
(or the equivalent) from such an institution from among the 
disciplines listed in clause (i). 


(3) The person must meet experience requirements 
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. Such requirements 
shall, at a minimum, include a requirement for at least four 
years of experience in an acquisition position in the Depart- 
ment of Defense or in a comparable position in industry or 
government. 

(4) The person must meet such other requirements as 
the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military 
department concerned prescribes by regulation. 

(c) EXCEPTIONS. — (1) The requirements of subsec- 
tions (b) (2) (A) and (b) (2) (B) shall not apply to any employee 
who, on October 1, 1991, has at least 10 years of experience 
in acquisition positions or in comparable positions in other 
government agencies or the private sector. 

(2) The requirements of subsections (b) (2) (A) and 
(b) (2) (B) shall not apply to any employee who is serving 
in an acquisition position on October 1, 1991, and who does 
not have the 10 years experience as described in paragraph 
(1) if the employee passes an examination considered by the 
Secretary of Defense to demonstrate skills, knowledge, or 
abilities comparable to that of an individual who has com- 
pleted at least 24 semester credit hours (or the equivalent) 
of study from an accredited institution of higher education 
from among the following disciplines: accounting, business 
finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial 
management, marketing, quantitative methods, and 
organization and management. The Secretary of Defense 
shall submit examinations to be given to civilian employees 
under this paragraph to the Director of the Office of Per- 
sonnel Management for approval. If the Director does not 
disapprove an examination within 30 days after the date on 
which the Director receives the examination, the examina- 
tion is deemed to be approved by the Director. 

(d) WAIVER. — (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
the acquisition career program board of a military depart- 
ment may waive any or all of the requirements of subsec- 
tion (b) with respect to an employee of that military 
department if the board certifies that the employee possesses 
significant potential for advancement to levels of greater 
responsibility and authority, based on demonstrated 
analytical and decisionmaking capabilities, job performance, 
and qualifying experience. With respect to each waiver 
granted under this subsection, the board shall set forth in 
a written document the rationale for its decision to waive 
such requirements. The document shall be submitted to and 
retained by the Director of Acquisition Education, Training 
and Career Development. 

(2) The acquisition career program board of a 
military department may not waive the requirements of 
subsection (b) (2) (A) (ii). 

(e) MOBILITY STATEMENTS.— (1) The Secretary of 
Defense is authorized to require civilians in an Acquisition 
Corps to sign mobility statements. 

(2) The Secretary of Defense shall identify which 
categories of civilians in an Acquisition Corps, as a condi- 
tion of serving in the Corps, shall be required to sign mobility 
statements. The Secretary shall make available published in- 
formation on such identification of categories.” 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 49 



CAREER DEVELOPMENT UPDATE 


Training with Congress 

The 1991-92 Training with Congress Fellowship Program 
(sponsored by the American Defense Preparedness Associa- 
tion) is underway. Officers selected to participate in this 
year’s program are: LTC Colleen F. Prasil, FA 51; LTC Charles 
L. Mudd, FA 53; and LTC Duwayne W. Jones, FA 97. 

Army Acquisition Corps officers who are graduates of the 
Program Management Course and are interested in par- 
ticipating in next year’s program should contact their assign- 
ment officers at PERSCOM. 

Civilian Graduate Study Program 

We are pleased to announce the panel results for the selec- 
tion of civilians for the Army Acquisition Corps graduate 
study program. John L. Skrletts and Richard J. Snyder, both 
of the Program Executive Office, Communications Systems, 
have been selected to attend the Executive Master of Science 
in Engineering Program at the University of Pennsylvania. 


Command Eligibility 
for AAC Officers 

On Oct. 11, 1991, the chief of staff, Army made the decision 
that now allows Army Acquisition Corps FA 51 and 97 officers 
to compete for functional area Table of Distribution and 
Allowances commands when those positions are determined 
to be acquisition related and added to the AAC critical position 
list. 

A listing of AAC command positions associated with this deci- 
sion will be published in the next issue of Army RD&A 
Bulletin. 


BOOK REVIEWS 


The Impact of R&D 
Investment on Productivity— 
New Evidence Using 
Linked R&D-LRD Data 

By Frank R. Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel 
An Article Published in Economic Inquiry, Volume 
XXIX, No. 2, April 1991, pages 203-229 

Reviewed by CPT Tom Gilbert, an Army Acquisition Corps 
officer currently attending Oregon State University. 

This research article illustrates the impact of technological 
change, or more precisely, the effects of research and 
development (R&D) on the U.S. national economy. This fac- 
tor is important as it relates to the investment business sec- 
tors are willing to place in future production capability. This 
has been an indicator of competitive behavior and improv- 
ed performance and output. 

The article asserts that investment in R&D has a strong 
impact on the overall productivity growth of business. The 
authors used various modeling series to examine the 
available data and the implications of R&D to productivity 
growth. They cited the diversification of business as the most 
difficult obstacle to quantify the analysis of available data 
since business does not always operate in one specific com- 
mercial segment. 

The writers explained the Longitudinal Research Database 
(LRD) that consolidates the measures of productivity at the 
business level. This time series file contains a large volume 
of data on various business segments. Through the LRD, a 


measurement of business productivity has been 
demonstrated with a correlation between increased R&D 
investment and increased productivity. The authors cited 
a lack of good quality productivity measurement as a leading 
factor in previous models. They emphasized the need to use 
micro-level studies versus the aggregate macro studies used 
on industry-wide comparisons. They were, however, cogni- 
zant of the limitations of the micro study and outlined some 
of the predominant factors. 

One area of interest was the revelation that federally- 
funded R&D programs, and these include the military R&D 
activities, have limited measurable impact except with the 
productivity of the small industry sector. Measurement of 
the impact of federal funds may be difficult due to the nature 
of the investment (non-industrial related research and 
defense) and the problem of measuring the related industry 
benefits to that research. It was noted that federally-funded 
research programs appeared to have little effect on produc- 
tivity growth (perhaps through inadequate measurement 
criteria). 

The researchers did point out that it is apparent that R&D 
returns on investment are increasing over time. The size of 
the firm engaging in R&D was a factor in the rate of return. 
It appeared that the smaller the firm, the less it received in 
return on R&D investment. The rate of return on basic 
research by industry was noted as a strong determinant in 
productivity increases. 

In conclusion, the researchers reaffirmed that there was 
a distinct relationship of R&D to positive productivity 
growth. Yet it remains uncertain to what degree the model 
underestimates economic growth from the contribution of 
federal and military efforts and expense on research and 
development. 


50 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 







BOOK REVIEWS 


Assignment: Pentagon— 

The Insider’s Guide 
to the Potomac 
Puzzle Palace 

By MG Perry M. Smith, USAF (retired) 
Pergamon-Brassey’s: 1989 

Reviewed by John Brand, LABCOM Survivability Manage- 
ment Office 

This little book is not just an engaging and entertaining 
essay in mere survival for Pentagon-bound military. It is a 
delightful mixture of coping strategies for staff people, a win- 
dow into anecdotal history, and a discourse on ethics and 
philosophy. Although the advice on coping professionally 
with a Pentagon staff environment and its stresses is intensely 
practical and situation oriented, it is applicable to any staff 
assignment in any headquarters — I suspect it would do for 
Xerox or IBM as well as DOD. The advice is also applicable 
for workers in research and development or test and evalua- 
tion. This book should be read by military and civilian 
defense professionals — and by others. 

There is a wealth of advice on mundane matters such as 
car pooling (not least to limit the work day), finding things 
in “The Building,” house hunting, and so on. These alone 
would justify getting and reading the book. But more im- 
portant, especially to anyone who works with other human 
beings, is the advice on being a good staff officer. That ad- 
vice is useful to all military and civil professionals. 

The advice is simple and concrete, as a few of the chapter 
headings suggest: The Pentagon: Realities and Myths 
(Chapter 2); Rules of Thumb: Helpful Hints on How to Get 
Ready to Work, Survive and Thrive (Chapter 3); Where Were 
You When the Page Was Blank? . . . the Agony and the Ecstasy 
of the Action Officer (Chapter 6); Difficult Bosses (Chapter 
9); Working with Defense Contractors (Chapter 15); Some 
of the Fudge Factory’s Deficiencies (Chapter 16); Interview- 
ing (Chapter 18); How to Give and Receive Briefings in the 
Pentagon (Chapter 19); People Who Can Help You (Chapter 
22); Military Ethics in the Pentagon (Chapter 25); and Future 
Shock: Pentagon Changes Through the 1990s (Chapter 26). 

These bits of advice never mince words. For example, in 
“Rules of Thumb” we are told: 

“Learn from the Bad Folks. The good people 
are plentiful . . . However, you can learn more 
of what not to do from the bad people: the slick 
operators, the sycophants, the manipulators, 
those who play fast and loose with the 
facts . . . 

“ Learn whom to trust and whom not to trust 

‘ ‘ Maintain your integrity In the jungle of the 
Washington scene, it is quite easy to sell your soul 
incrementally without even realizing what you 


are doing. 

There are certainly lots of temptations to cook 
the numbers . . . 

“ Beware of those who operate outside the 
system . . . 

“ Watch out for Loose cannons on the deck 

“Be prepared to be fired ..." 

The essence of a Service staff, and perhaps even more of 
a Joint Staff, is teamwork. Underlying the team work, 
however, is the advocacy process that is used to determine 
the common point of view. This dynamic ebb and flow of 
ideas, with defense of often competing points of view, is 
often misinterpreted as useless pandemonium. What is 
overlooked is the essential noisiness of any free market, 
especially one of ideas. A static appearance may be mistaken 
for perfection, but such an environment cannot adapt to a 
changing world. Of course, unless the market place of ideas 
eventually converges to a common policy, the process is in- 
effectual, and cannot adapt to any world. Good staff work 
is one of the essences of the general staff — the other is leader- 
ship, and this book has a lot of advice about both. But 
without ethics neither action officer nor leader can func- 
tion, and ethics is a theme that recurs over and over 
throughout this book. 

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this book, one 
which commends it to the attention of anti-militarists in 
academia or citizens interested in all aspects of the social 
environment in which they live, is the window into the 
philosophy of an intensely ethical and honest man. Ill wind 
notwithstanding, and contrary to some sensationalist 
novelists and reporters, the people who end up in The 
Building are drawn from society rather than some foreign 
planet — they are just usually brighter and harder working 
than the average. The advice that is given is based on how 
to function according to a code of conduct based on honor, 
and there is a large segment of the population that needs 
to be exposed to advice to working people based on com- 
mon and tacit acceptance of honor, honesty and intelligent 
public service. The philosophy in this book is not a sermon 
to the believing or propaganda to the disbelieving; it is a 
discourse from one public servant to another based on and 
with shared acceptance of a philosophy as a working tool. 
This is more enlightening to the cynical or the misled than 
all the press releases in the world. 

Perhaps the best advice on ethics is summed up in the 
chapter on “Military Ethics in the Pentagon:” 

“Military services must, of course, understand 
the bureaucratic and political rules of the game, 
but they can still live within the framework of 
high institutional and personal integrity. If stan- 
ding up for a principle costs you a promotion, 
a great new job , or forced retirement, so be it . ” 

(P- 230) 

It is worth remembering that this was written by a man 
who earned the rank of Major General — and that in spite 
of having once been fired in mid-career, as he says, from a 
job in the Pentagon. 


*u.s. 


November-December 1991 


Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 51 




BOOK REVIEWS 


The Political Economy 
of Military 
Expenditure: 

An Introduction 

By Peter Dunne 

An Article Published in The Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Volume 14, No. 4, December 1990, 
pages 395-404 

Reviewed by CPT Tom Gilbert, an Army Acquisition Corps 
officer attending Oregon State University 

This article illustrates a contemporary view of the impor- 
tance and impact of military expenditure on the economies 
of modern industrialized countries, specifically the U.S. and 
Britain. The paper outlines divergent thoughts on the ef- 
fect of the “peace dividend” on a nation’s economy. 

This research is of particular relevance since the U.S. 
military is entering the first stage of a sizable contraction in 
force levels, weapons procurement and total gross expen- 
ditures. Since the U.S. military will enter the new century 
at its smallest size (in both manpower and percent of GNP) 
since before the Korean War, this article provides a unique 
perspective on the anticipated impact on the economy. 

The article acknowledges that military expenditure has 
significant impact on the economy for the employment it 
provides through direct or indirect means and the trade it 
permits. The largest problem in adequately measuring the 


cost effectiveness of that expenditure has been the inabili- 
ty to measure the force capability of the military as a quan- 
tifiable and finite figure. 

Three approaches to examining the military’s role in the 
economy were discussed. They were the neoclassical, 
liberal, and Marxist economic approaches. A corollary ef- 
fect of military expenditure, called underconsumption, is 
that using the military as an outlet permits the “absorption 
of surplus” without the increase in payroll to maintain con- 
tribution levels. 

Macro-economic effects of military spending appear to 
adversely impact the ability of the nation in the area of con- 
sumption expenditure. The cost of the military reduces 
capital that could have been used by the public and private 
sectors of the economy. A side effect of military action, ac- 
cording to the author, is that so long as the conflict does 
not directly impact the nation, war is basically good for the 
stock markets. 

The industrial effects of the military, specifically with pro- 
curement, illustrates the potential to use this sector as a 
means of achieving artificial employment levels. An exam- 
ple of this in the U.S. is that as the military draws down, we 
are seeing the parochial side of the elected officials as they 
scramble to save their own district’s military complex. 

Overall, the economic effects of military reductions are 
difficult to quantify. It is the considered opinion of the 
author and his colleagues that the downsizing of the military 
is anticipated to be good for the economy. This will permit 
the economy as a whole to seize new economic oppor- 
tunities. 




Book Reviews 


If you have read a book which you feel may be of special 
interest to the RD&A community, please contact us. The 
editorial staff welcomes your literary recommendations. 

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typed pages. In addition, please note the complete title of 
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the address below. 

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52 Army Research, Development & Acquisition Bulletin 


November-December 1991 




FROM THE 
ARMY ACQUISITION 
EXECUTIVE. . . 


Today the Army acquisition community faces a major challenge: 
to develop, produce, and field superior equipment for our soldiers 
with the smallest budgets in a decade. The Army must deal with 
this reality as we modernize. Success in future conflicts depends 
on accomplishing more with less and reinforces the arguments for 
more effective contracting. 

The essential steps in system contracting are: (1) requirement 
statement; (2) source selection; (3) development contracting; (4) 
contract management; and, (5)productionaward. Wemustplan 
for and carefully manage each of these steps. I suggest the follow- 
ing be considered as we move into this era of budget constrained 
modernization: 

1 . Balanced requirements. We are often accused of “gold- 
plating” weapon systems. With decreasing budgets, streamlined, 
realistic requirements are more critical than ever. We need to be 
sure that we do not ask for more than the technology can deliver, 
for earlier delivery than can be achieved with moderate risk, or for 
capabilities that are more than we can afford. Our requests for data 
need to be tailored to specific programs. Although considerations 
for follow-on competition often require that we obtain technical 
data packages, we should examine the program's future and 
realistically determine the benefits versus the costs of these data. 

2 . Best value source selections. The source selection process 
reduces the field of competitors to that offeror who can best 
deliver the required product within the proposed cost and con- 
tract schedule. To assure the selection of that offeror, our solicita- 
tions must emphasize: 

(a) Realistic proposals. Award to a contractor with unrealistic 
costs will lead to either cost and schedule overruns or unsatisfac- 
tory performance or both, possibly concluding with a major 
restructuring or contract termination . Our aim is ‘ ‘best value, ’ ’ in- 
cluding equitable distribution of risks — not to secure the lowest 
estimated award price. It is essential that each contractor’s pro- 
posal be measured against a government cost estimate (GCE) 
tailored to his proposed approach . I encourage Source Selection 
Authorities to instruct their Source Selection Evaluation Board 
Chairmen to assess the realism of each cost/price proposal using 
a GCE based on that contractor's technical and management ap- 
proach. 

(b) Program affordability. We must employ the technique of 
Design to Cost (DTC) to balance the importance of development, 
production, and operating and support costs. DTC serves as a 
yardstick and works to encourage that systems are developed 
within the original cost, performance and time frameworks. 

(c) Past performance. A contractor’s applicable track record 
of technical, cost and management performance should be con- 
sidered during evaluation. Evaluators should thoroughly examine 
a contractor’s performance on similar efforts. We must be tough 
but fair in the evaluation of past performance. Data must be timely 
and accurate. We should fully investigate negative reports to con- 
firm their applicability to the current selection. All negative data 
should be discussed with offerors so they have an opportunity to 
respond. 

(d) Management structure. The organizational structure cited 


in the management proposal should indicate how the contractor 
will implement his technical proposal. Evaluators should carefully 
review the organizational structure, relationships and ar- 
rangements (such as joint ventures, teaming proposals, and even 
significant subcontract agreements) to assure accountability and 
clear responsibility for contract performance by a defined prime 
contractor organizational entity and specific individuals. In 
evaluating these arrangements, take into account government risk 
associated with lack of accountability. As a general proposition, 
we should use joint ventures only as a last resort because of the 
divided responsibilities inherent in those relationships. 

3. Development contracting. In Engineering and Manufac- 
turing Development (EMD) contracts we must evaluate the entire 
cost proposal and insist on fee structures that represent a true pic- 
ture of the contractor’s share of risk. We should aggressively seek 
a contract type that incent ivizes contractors to hold costs within 
their proposed estimate while adhering to the contract’s technical 
requirements. Incentive fee contracts should have share ratios 
which provide meaningful rewards for cost underruns and signifi- 
cant loss of fee for cost overruns. Myjune27, 1991 memo, “Con- 
tracting for Research and Development,” covers this subject in 
more detail. 

4. Contract management. Contract management is a team ef- 
fort involving the Administrative Contracting Officer, the Procur- 
ing Contracting Officer, as well as the PEO and PM. The 
contractor’s performance must be carefully monitored to provide 
early detection of problems. 

Even with proper safeguards in place, major problems can still 
arise. When a contract is hampered with serious cost over- 
runs/cost growth and/or unacceptable schedule delays, the Army 
must consider contract termination. Contracts should clearly in- 
dicate those conditions which would prompt the Army to initiate 
a review to determine if the effort should be terminated. 

5. Affordable production. Past acquisition strategies have 
been characterized by fixed price or not-to-exceed (NTE) produc- 
tion options in competitively awarded, cost type EMD contracts. 
These option requirements often fail to consider a contractor’s in- 
ability to realistically price ill-defined options early in the develop- 
ment program. While there may be an argument for locking-in 
production prices while still in a competitive phase, we should not 
place unwarranted financial risk on the contractor — precisely 
what we are avoiding with the cost reimbursable EMD contract. 

Instead of insisting on fixed or NTE option prices prior to award , 
we should give the contractor time to learn more about the system 
and its production costs by delaying negotiation of production op- 
tions until after Critical Design Review . T o encourage reasonable 
prices in production, development contracts should be structured 
to provide significant award fees to contractors who meet the 
original DTC. 

We must develop the most appropriate approach for each ac- 
quisition. Our ability to accomplish Army modernization objec- 
tives will be enhanced with streamlined realistic requirements, 
selection of the best value contractor, by effectively monitoring 
his efforts and ensuring affordable production systems for our 
troops. I am confident that the general approaches described 
above will help us meet this challenge. 

Stephen K. Conver 




UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 


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